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ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses three important price judgments: price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectation. Developed over three chapters, the main objective of this
research is to determine underlying differences in these three price judgments. These differences
are based on conceptualizing price fairness as a combination of affective and cognitive
components, whereas price magnitude and price expectation reflect different cognitive aspects of
price judgment. Chapter 1 provides a literature review and identifies several research questions
related to these three price judgments; Chapters 2 and 3 provide testable hypotheses and conduct
three pretests and two experiments to test the hypotheses. Using structural equation modeling
and repeated measures ANOVA, the interrelationships, the antecedents, and the consequences of
these price judgments are described and analyzed. Chapter 2 examines the effects of focal price,
locus of control, judgment environment, and judgment/intent order on price fairness, price
magnitude, price expectation, and purchase intent. Chapter 3 examines the effects of focal price,
judgment environment, mood, and processing fluency on the three price judgments and their
subsequent effects on purchase intent and anger.
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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS AMONG PRICE FAIRNESS, PRICE
MAGNITUDE, AND PRICE EXPECTATION
1.1

INTRODUCTION
Marketing theories have expanded from axiomatic-choice theory and rational utility

theory to behavioral pricing theory (Estelami and Maxwell 2004), which explains psychological
implications of pricing by analyzing how price information affects consumer judgment and
decisions. Exploring behavioral pricing, researchers attempt to understand how contextual and
cognitive factors influence consumer price judgments, preferences, and choices. Contextual
factors such as available information, market conditions, price distributions, price frames, price
semantics and images, and cognitive factors such as information processing, memory,
involvement, and motivations, are considered important in behavioral research (Liu and Soman
2008)
Price judgment research owes much of its basis to judgment and decision making
theories. Hastie (2001, pp.655-656) summarizes judgment and decision making research:
“The focus of (this) research is on how people (and other organisms and machines)
combine desires (utilities, personal values, goals, ends, etc) and beliefs (expectations,
knowledge, means, etc) to choose a course of action. The conceptual (perhaps defining)
template for a decision includes three components: (a) courses of action (choice options
and alternatives); (b) beliefs about objective states, processes, and events in the world
(including outcome states and means to achieve them); and (c) desires, values, or utilities
that describe the consequences associated with the outcomes of each”
Judgment and decision making research has expanded to three broad theoretical domains
(Hastie 2001): a) utility theory; b) cognitive algebraic theory; and c) cognitive computational
theory. Utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), based on axioms of consistency,
linearity, and convexity of preferences, suggests that choices are outcomes of weighted
probabilities assigned to alternatives, in which an alternative that has the maximum utility is
always chosen (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981). The related premise of prospect theory (Kahneman
1

and Tversky 1979) finds that, in reality, several axioms of utility theory are violated. Prospect
theory proposes that decision makers simplify their cognitive choices by adopting a two-stage
decision process where framing in the first stage allows consumers to attach and edit
probabilistic values to alternatives that in the second stage are evaluated and chosen (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). Cognitive algebraic theories propose that choice, an outcome of human
judgment and decision making, can be represented through simple algebraic models (i.e.,
cognitive algebra; Petty and Cacioppo 1996). Cognitive computational theories study perceptual,
inferential, and mnemonic functions involved in price judgment (Hastie 2001).
Research in price judgment explains how price plays an important role in determining
consumers’ judgments, choices, and purchase intent (Monroe 1973). Price provides both
quantitative and qualitative components of judgment and decision making (Monroe 1973). Out
of a myriad of external and internal stimuli confronting a buyer, such as price, brand attributes,
product design, purchase environment, and psychological inputs, organization of information
becomes crucial, and price plays an important role in integrating and evaluating an offer (Grewal
et al. 1998; Monroe 1973). The role price plays in this combinatorial process is far from being
simple. The focus of this research is to decipher how an external price cue affects price
judgments and purchase intent. Specifically, understanding differences in price judgments is of
prime importance in this research. This chapter defines and categorizes judgments, reviews price
judgments in the context of judgment and decision making research, and explains three important
price judgments. Subsequent discussions propose pertinent research questions and motivations to
study these questions, followed by a literature review of each research question.
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1.2

PRICE JUDGMENTS

1.2.1

Definitions and Types of Judgments
According to German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781), judgment (Urteil) is a type of

cognition (Erkenntnis), and a basic human faculty (Hanna 2009). He defined judgment as “an
objective, conscious, mental representation, and an output of cognitive capacity” (Hanna 2009).
American philosopher and psychologist John Dewey (1910) considers judgment a mental
process that represents inferences. According to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary,
judgment is “the process of forming an opinion, or evaluation by discerning and comparing an
opinion or estimate so formed.” Webster’s definition characterizes judgment as the process of
comparison and evaluation, rather than the outcome. In other words, judgment could be
understood as a process through which a person forms, evaluates, and compares opinions.
In the consumer behavior literature, judgments refer to consumer evaluations or estimates
of product attributes (Johnson and Puto 1987). Judgment guides our decision making, leading to
a choice and producing an outcome (Rachlin 1989). Hence, a judgment can be considered as a
process of evaluation and its outcome. In marketing, judgments are considered as assessment,
estimation, and inferences about events, outcomes, and processes (Hastie 2001). Preferences, as
outcomes of judgments, are considered expressed behaviors of choosing a course of action over
others (Hastie 2001).
Information processing theory explains two fundamental mechanisms that underlie
human judgments (Liu and Soman 2008): a) a systematic, effortful examination of the context,
which generates interpretations and evaluations and is called central or systematic processing
(Eagley and Chaiken 1993); and b) a quick, less effortful use of already existing concepts, ideas,
or expectations, known as peripheral or heuristic processing (Chaiken et al. 1989).

3

Janiszweski et al. (2008, p.152) provide an extensive list of judgment categories:
"A base judgment can be a belief (e.g. “there is a God.”), an attitude (e.g., “I like
chocolate.”), a decision (e.g., “I’ll bet on team X.”), an estimate(e.g., “It’s worth about
$40.”), a prediction (e.g., “I’ll get an “A” on the exam.”), an assessment (e.g., “I am in
good shape.”), a plan (e.g., “I’ll start my diet tomorrow.”), and so forth. The judgment
can concern accuracy (e.g., “How much do I know?”), confidence (e.g., “How certain am
I?”), intent (e.g., “How likely am I to act?”), or insight (e.g., “I did this because...”)."
Judgment categorization varies widely across disciplines. For example, in mathematics
and logic, two types of judgments, inductive and deductive, are considered important (Katz
1998). In behavioral sciences, judgments are classified as: a) non-evaluative, such as belief
(Hamilton 1971); b) evaluative, such as attitude (Olson and Zanna 1993; Schwarz 2007); c)
preference (Johnson and Puto 1987); d) inference, as reflected in heuristics (McGuire 1997); e)
prediction, as represented in expectation (Hoch 1985); and f) assessment and comparative, as
found in computation, parity determination, and numerical cognition (Leffkof-Hagius and Mason
1993).
Non-evaluative or belief-based judgments are mental representations of existing
knowledge, structured as propositions or premises (Schwitzgebel 2006). Marks (1982) finds no
difference between belief and non-evaluative judgment, and hence described this judgment as
non-evaluative belief. Non-evaluative judgments reflect impressions (Hamilton 1971). They
generate likes and dislikes, positive or negative valences toward judged objects (Winkielman et
al. 1990). Non-evaluative judgments can be expressed in two dimensions: potency and activation
(Hamilton 1971).
Evaluative judgment is an assessment of value, quality, or importance (Winkielman et al.
1990). Evaluative judgment is a psychological tendency that expresses a degree of favor and
disfavor (Schwarz 2007). An example of an evaluative judgment is attitude. Schwarz (2007)
argues that there is no difference between attitude and evaluative judgments. In an extensive
4

review of evaluative judgment and attitude, Schwarz (2007) suggests that evaluative judgment is
adaptive and context sensitive, formed instantaneously, and can be classified in terms of
intensity, stability, personal involvement, and behavioral relevance (Schwarz 2007). Wittenbrink
(2007), using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), suggests that context dependency is a primary
characteristic of evaluative judgment. Researchers found no evidence of context independence,
despite situations when evaluative judgments could be derived from automatic processes
(Ferguson and Bergh 2007). In contrast to a mere statement of facts, or lexical ordering of
information, evaluative judgment is often found to describe phenomena such as stereotyping and
prejudice (Wittenbrink et al. 2001). Outcomes of evaluative judgments are explained through
attitude-behavior consistency theory, which suggests that behaviors are found to be consistent
with the evaluations made (Schwarz 2007). Haminlton and Huffman (1971) argue that both nonevaluative and evaluative judgments can be expressed either through summated models
(Fishbein and Hunter 1964), or averaging models (Anderson 1971).
An important component of behavioral decision theory is preference judgment
(Novemsky et al. 2007). Preference judgment is a process of selecting one specific response from
many alternatives (Paulus and Frank 2003). Preference determines which object is favored over
another (Olson and Zanna 1993). Using one or more comparative dimensions, this judgment
produces an inclination or liking for a particular product, brand, or service. Preference judgment
can emerge from valenced evaluation (attitude) or from prior satisfaction, affect, behavioral
tendency, or choice (Holbrook 2006). Preference judgment is considered to be an important
determinant of choice (Novemsky et al. 2007). As opposed to a more automatic, rule-based
choice, preference-based choice is constructed, and it explains a variety of choice situations,
including deferred and compromised choices (Mellers et al. 1998; Novemsky et al. 2007).
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Inferential judgment draws a conclusion, based on interpretations of a context, existing
knowledge, or heuristics (Loftus and Beach 1982). In decision making research, choices have
been found to be contingent on inferential judgment (Dick et al. 1990). Consumers often make
decisions based on limited or uncertain information. What makes inferential judgment interesting
is its capacity to draw causal arguments based on information beyond what is immediately
available (Kardes et al. 2004). By answering if-then questions, inference judgment creates
linkages between information available as cues, heuristics, arguments, knowledge, or beliefs.
Inferential judgment rests on two important premises (Kardes et al. 2004): a) inductive, which
explains the process of generalizing a conclusion from specific information; and b) deductive, or
constructing specific conclusions from a general assumption or understanding. Information used
for inferential judgment could be externally available, as found in stimulus-based or data-driven
processing, or could be retrieved from memory as found in memory or theory-based processing
(Lynch and Srull 1982). For memory-based processing, previously formed attitudes, beliefs, and
categories may serve as important memory cues (Lynch and Srull 1982). The major distinction
between inductive and deductive inferences lies in the type of outputs that these judgments
generate. Inductive inferences lead to generalization, learning, and predictions, but deductive
inferences yield hypothesis evaluation, logical reasoning, and evaluative conclusions (Kardes et
al. 2004). Recent research also shows that inductive inference is forward-looking and tries to
predict an expectation for the future, while deductive reasoning, operates as a backward looking
diagnostic measure and tries to determine the accuracy of a judgment (Mass et al. 2001).
Predictive judgments can be expressed as outcomes of inferences, and imply what people
anticipate will happen (Hogarth 1987). Studied under covariation judgment, a predictive
judgment generates an evaluation based on a single cue or multiple cues of covariations of

6

attributes (Sawyer 1993). Constructed as expectation, predictive judgment generates mental
assessment of a probabilistic outcome (Hoch 1985). In behavioral research, two phenomena,
forecasting and backcasting, are found to characterize predictive judgments (Ebbert et al. 2009).
These two processes explain how a hedonic expectation of a future outcome guides consumer
decision making (Ebbert et al. 2009). Anticipated feelings of pleasure, guilt, anger, and regret
have been found to influence a broad range of consumption decisions (Gilbert et al. 1998).
Predictive judgments consist of three stages (Hoch 1985): a) accumulation of evidence; b)
evaluation of evidence; c) assigning a numerical value to represent subjective perception of
future probability. Research on calibration and overconfidence shows confidence is a primary
determinant of predictive judgments (Hoch 1985). It is interesting to note that for a wide variety
of tasks, people have been found to be overconfident in their predictions (Hoch 1985).
A similarity or comparative judgment compares a pair of entities in terms of magnitudes
of an attribute, trait, attitude, etc. (Thurstone 1929). Comparative judgment is applied in
comparing intensities of stimulus values (Thustone 1994). Examples of this judgment are
abundant in daily experiences. For example, when comparing light, sound, prices, satisfaction,
and value, we engage in comparative judgment. Two important laws proposed in the literature,
Weber’s law and Fechner’s law have been used in predicting comparative judgments from
quantitative and qualitative attributes (Thurstone 1994). Personal bias, motivation (Moore and
Small 2007), speed of processing, and cognitive styles (Blais et al. 2005) have been found to
influence comparative judgments.
In general, judgments have been found to influence a wide array of outcomes. Outcomes
relevant for behavioral research include satisfaction and regret (Gilovich and Medvec 1995),
confidence (Alba and Hutchinson 2000), learning (Dunlosky and Nelson 1994), belief and
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attitude (Schwarz 2007), anchoring and adjustment based estimation (Einhorn and Hogarth
1981), cause and effect inference (Koriat et al. 2006), and memory and choice (Schooler and
Schooler 1990). Based on the above discussion of judgment categorizations and outcomes, it is
relevant to determine characteristics and categorization of price judgments.
1.2.2

Price Judgments
A price judgment is defined as the process by which consumers translate prices into

meaningful cognitions (Lichtenstein et al. 1988). Consumers store price information in memory
as subjective interpretations (Oh and Jeong 2004). Instead of using nominal values, consumers
often evaluate prices by using words such as “too high,” “fair,” “acceptable,” “very reasonable,”
or “expected” (Monroe and Lee 1999; Zeithaml 1988). Consumer dependence on these
subjective interpretations has prompted researchers to understand price judgments as a process of
“knowing” prices rather than “remembering” prices (Monroe and Lee 1999). Subjective price
knowledge, rather than recollecting actual price, reflects price judgment (Lichtenstein et al.
1993; Monroe 1973).
Price judgment is essentially a comparative process (Lichtenstein et al. 1988; Monroe
1990). Researchers accept that consumers judge focal prices in relation to reference prices
(Monroe 1990). Hence, differences in construction and interpretation of reference prices generate
differences in price judgments. Because this comparative process is context-, person-, and
situation-specific, the same focal price may be interpreted differently by different consumers or
in different contexts (Lichtenstein et al. 1988). For example, a consumer with a wide reference
price range may find a particular price as more acceptable than someone whose reference range
is narrower (Lichtenstein et al. 1988).
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1.2.3

Price Judgment Literature Review
Figure 1.1 illustrates two analytical frameworks— stimulus-organism-response model

(SOR model; Jacoby and Olson 1977) and information integration model (Anderson 1971)—that
explain cognitive processes by which consumers evaluate focal prices.
SOR model:
Organism
(price judgment)

Stimulus
(focal price)

Response
(overt)

Information integration model:
Actual (focal)
price

Internal representation
of prices
Valuation
function

Integration
function

Price
judgment

Actual (overt)
response
Response
function

Figure 1.1 Comparing cognitive process models of price judgment
Jacoby and Olson (1977) propose a stimulus-organism-response (SOR) model that
explains how human judgments and responses are developed from environmental stimuli. Their
organism component elaborates on descriptions of mental processes that influence perception
and judgment (Jacoby 2002). In this model, observed prices provide the environmental inputs
(stimuli), perceptual changes of inputs develop price judgments in consumers’ minds (organism),
and the organism is expressed as responses to the prices (Jacoby 2002).
Lichtenstein et al. (1988) use the SOR model to explain how price acceptability, a price
judgment, is generated. After observing a price cue (environmental stimulus), consumers
compare the price to a range of acceptable prices retrieved from memory (organism component),
which are influenced by their price-quality inferences, price consciousness, and product
involvement (Lichtenstein et al. 1988), and finally are expressed as price judgment (response
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component). Similarly, Maxwell (2002) applies the SOR model to determine how focal prices
affect consumers’ willingness to purchase.
Anderson (1971) proposed an alternative model that helps overcome the SOR model’s
inability to predict precise price judgments. Anderson’s information integration model suggests
that price judgments could be represented through precise mathematical relationships (Anderson
1971; Huber and McCann 1982). Using the information integration model, Niedrich et al. (2001)
summarize the processes by which consumers generate price judgments. First, physical stimuli of
observed prices generate internal representations, which can be measured using valuation
functions. Next, the internal representations are converted to subjective price judgments (covert
responses), represented through integration functions, and finally, consumers generate overt
responses, reflecting their covert price judgments, which can be represented using response
functions.
Valuation functions, represented as logarithmic or power functions, specify relationships
between physical stimuli and their representations as subjective values (Niedrich et al. 2001).
Integration functions generate price judgments using internal representation of actual prices.
Three functional forms of integration functions exist and are based on: a) adaptation level theory
(Helson 1964), which proposes that price judgment is proportional to the difference between
subjective value of focal stimulus and the mean value (the adaptation level) of contextual prices;
b) range theory (Volkman 1951), which suggests that price judgment is proportional to a ratio of
the difference between focal price and the minimum subjective value of the reference range, to
the difference between reference range’s highest and the lowest values; and c) range-frequency
theory (Parducci 1965), which suggests price judgments are a weighted linear function of range
and frequency of the reference prices, where weights are assigned to proportionate range values
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and ranking values of the contextual prices. Response function denotes the retrieval of subjective
judgments into an overt rating using a linear function. Niedrich et al. (2001) predict price
judgments using an integration function under different sets of contextual conditions. Their
findings show that frequency effects surpass range effects in a stimulus-based context, but range
effects dominate frequency effects in a memory-based context.
Cognitive basis of contextual effects on price judgments can be explained using
processing level theories (Hristova et al. 2005). Low-level processing theories propose that
external stimuli change perceptions early in processing stages, whereas high-level processing
theories suggest stimuli are processed in parallel to judgment processes (Hristova et al. 2005). A
general cognitive architecture, known as judgment mapping or JUDGMAP models, proposes two
fundamental processes that underlie low-level or high-level processing (Hristova et al. 2005): a)
analogy-making, through which consumers map a target stimulus to an exemplar, and apply
cognitive phenomena such as reasoning, inference, perception, and comparison, to develop an
overt response that reflects price judgment; and b) a spreading activation mechanism, through
which associative and constructive mechanisms of human memory perform connectionist and
symbolic cognitive roles. Relative activation strength and diffusion speed have been found to
influence human judgment (Hristova et al. 2005). Applied to price judgments, these two broad
physical cognitive mechanisms help researchers explore how price information is encoded,
retained, and retrieved, and to explain how price information connects to other cognitive areas.
Interestingly, using a spreading activation mechanism, effects of unrelated or irrelevant
stimuli on price judgments could be explained. Irrelevant stimuli, such as loudness of sounds
(Marks 1988), taste (Rankin and Marks 1991, 1992), touch (Marks and Armstrong 1996), smell
(Rankin and Marks 2000), visuals in the form of length of vertical and horizontal lines (Arieh

11

and Marks 2002; Potts 1991), colors of geometric shapes and sizes (Goldstone 1995), and line
length (Kokinov et al. 2004), have been found to influence various aspects of judgment,
including price judgments. Understanding how irrelevant information affects human judgments
opens up interesting perspectives on price judgment.
Price judgments play an important role in consumers’ buying decisions (Grewal et al.
1998). Consumers use price information for two main purposes: a) to infer non price attributes
such as product quality; and b) to calculate monetary sacrifice of a purchase (Suri and Monroe
2003). With limited non-price information, consumers use price judgments to infer product
quality, but when non-price information is available, consumers contemplate mainly on the cost
component of the offer (Suri and Monroe 2003). Price judgments that affect this tradeoff
relationship of price-quality and price-sacrifice are found to influence consumers’ purchase
decisions (Suri et al. 2007).
Price judgment depends on context (Nowlis and Simnonson 1997). Contexts affect price
judgments in four ways (Liu and Soman 2008): a) modifying the number of alternatives or
attributes in a choice task; b) affecting construction and retrieval of reference prices; c)
impacting wording and framing of prices; and d) affecting consumers’ individual abilities to
process available price information.
Simonson and Taversky (1992) address choice alternatives in their dominated alternative
theory, which explores how tradeoff contrast and extremity aversion lead to a choice. This theory
explains that contextual effects on choice follow two hypotheses: a) tradeoff contrast states that
preference of an alternative is influenced by a tradeoff calculation between a focal alternative
and all other alternatives in the choice context; and b) extremeness aversion states that
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attractiveness of an alternative is greatly increased if it is in an intermediate range of options
rather than in the extremes.
Reference price context (i.e., how reference prices are constructed and retrieved) has
been found to affect price judgments (Niedrich et al. 2001). Adaptation level theory (Helson
1964), range theory (Volkmann 1951), and range frequency theory (Parducci 1965) explain how
reference prices affect price judgments. Whether reference prices are retrieved from memory or
from provided stimulus have been found to affect price judgments (Niedrich et al. 2001).
Alternative prices (of related products or from other markets), depth and frequency of discounts
(Alba et al. 1999; Lalwani and Monroe 2005), plausible and exaggerated referred prices (Biswas
and Blair 1991; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; Urbany et al. 1988), and anchoring and
adjustment to a relevant or irrelevant (incidental) starting price (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971)
have also been found to affect price judgments.
Low price guarantees (Arbatskya et al. 2004; Biswas et al. 2002), price framing (i.e., how
prices are presented), and temporal reframing (Gourville 1998) have been found to influence
price judgments. Under different cognitive constraints and processing fluencies, how people
perceive, encode, process, and evaluate price stimuli are influenced by price formats (Liu and
Soman 2008). Examples of price formats affecting price judgments are found through tensile
claims (Dhar et al. 1999; Mobley et al. 1988), right digit ending (Schindler and Kirby 1997), and
perceptual fluency (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Particularly, perceptual fluency is found to affect
comparative price judgments, through price information processing, beyond a conscious,
deliberate level (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Interesting findings by Coulter and Coulter (2005)
further emphasize the role of unconscious price assessment, through processes tapping into
perceptual fluency. Ease of information retrieval and information processing, influenced by
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distinctive color (Coulter 2002), size, position, isolation, or contrast of price information (Pieters
et al. 1996), or diagnosticity and accessibility (Menon et al. 1997) of price information from
memory may affect conscious or unconscious evaluation of price.
The next section identifies and distinguishes three price judgments: price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectation. Theoretical explanations as well as empirical evidence are
provided to help readers understand the characteristics of these three price judgments, their
differences, and their influences on consumers’ buying decisions.
1.2.4

Three Main Price Judgments
A dearth of literature exists to address differences between various price judgments. Past

price studies explained either isolated, individual price judgments, or various combined price
judgments. Research on expertise and knowledge categorization suggests that in situations where
buyers have low product knowledge, buyers benefit from using multiple processing modes
(Massaro and Friedman 1990). Lacking any other information, where prices are predominant
cues, multiple price judgments may be the most effective consumer strategy. Human behavior is
strongly influenced by multiple modes of information processing (Massaro and Friedman 1990).
From a practical standpoint, conceptualization of multidimensional price judgments provides the
most accurate understanding of real-world price judgments.
This research empirically tests a multidimensional model of price judgments. This
inquiry helps us understand if all the price judgments are of equal importance, whether price
expectation precedes any other price judgments, and whether price fairness is more important
than other price judgments. Analyzing price judgments of various types has not been addressed
in existing pricing research.
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Liu and Soman (2008) argue that price expectations influence price fairness. Consumers
compare actual prices to their expected prices. If the actual price exceeds their expectations,
consumers are likely to perceive the price as unfair (Heath et al. 1999). In repeat purchases,
consumers judge price fairness by comparing new prices to past or other prices (Bolton et al.
2003). Do consumers consider various types of price judgments while making purchases? Do
different price judgments influence consumers’ purchase decisions differently in different
situations? Are price judgments consciously constructed before making purchase decisions?
Answers to these questions are addressed by multidimensional-conceptualization of price
judgment.
Price judgments such as price fairness have been studied by several researchers (Bolton
et al. 2003; Campbell 1999; Haws and Bearden 2006; Maxwell 2002; Vaidyanathan and
Aggarwal 2003; Xia et al. 2004; Xia and Monroe 2005). Similarly, price magnitude (Adaval and
Monroe 2002; Coulter and Coulter 2005; Dehaene 1992; Thomas et al. 2007; Thomas and
Morwitz 2009) and price expectation (Delvecchio et al. 2007; Kalyani and Yim 2004; Kopalle
and Mullikin 2003; Lichtenstein et al. 1991; Menon et al. 1997; Turnovsky 1970) have also been
given due importance. Careful assessment of existing pricing studies indicates the clear
possibility of classifying price judgments in terms of price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation. This research, therefore, is designed to investigate three primary price judgments,
price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, in the same model. Table 1.1 summarizes
basic definitions, properties, affective or cognitive characteristics, and influencing factors for
each price judgment. Each price judgment is explored in depth in the following section.
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Table 1.1 Characterization of three price judgments
Price
Judgment

Definition

Price
fairness

How reasonable,
Evaluative and Combination
acceptable, just,
comparative
of affective
satisfactory a price is
and cognitive
component
How big, large, high, Comparative
Cognitive
huge a price is

Price
magnitude

Price
How predictable,
expectation common, ordinary a
price is

Judgment
properties

Predictive and
comparative

Affective
or cognitive

Cognitive

Influencing factors
past prices, competitor prices, prices
paid by other consumers, product
costs, store reputation, mood,
attribution (internal or external)
Mean, range, and frequency of
reference price, discount depth and
discount frequency, framing of
discounts, processing fluency
Judgment environment (memory or
stimulus-based context)

1.2.4.1 Price Fairness
In an exchange, judged fairness may reflect consumers’ perceptions of sacrifice and
benefits accrued to each party involved (Bolton et al. 2003). Price fairness is defined as a price
judgment that determines how just, reasonable, acceptable or satisfactory a price is (Xia and
Monroe 2005). Price fairness has been conceptualized as a comparative or evaluative judgment
(Wirtz and Kimes 2007; Xia et al. 2004), affected by consumers’ derived reasons behind a
retailer’s offer prices (Vaidyanthan and Aggarwal 2003). Perceived reasons for a retailer’s
pricing policy, the retailer’s reputation, or the retailer’s motives have been found to be important
drivers of price fairness (Campbell 1999). Factors such as degree of price control by retailers,
frequency and depth of price changes offered by retailers, production cost, technology, and other
external marketplace factors also have significant influence on price fairness (Kalapurakal et al.
1991; Maxwell 2002; Xia et al. 2004).
Price fairness has cognitive and affective dimensions (Xia and Monroe 2005). Its
cognitive aspect involves comparative judgment of an offer price to a reference standard; the
affective component includes evaluations based on feelings of unease, guilt, inequality, rejection,
anger, or even outrage (Xia et al. 2004). Defined from an affective perspective, price fairness
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has been described as associated emotions that determine how reasonable, acceptable, and
justifiable the difference is between competing sellers’ offer prices (Xia et al. 2004).
Real-world examples often reveal interesting facets of consumer beliefs about price
fairness. Concerns around prescription drug prices, gasoline prices, hidden fees charged by
service providers, or resentment toward Amazon’s dynamic pricing (charging different prices for
same product across different purchase situations) reflect consumers’ feelings that they are being
treated unfairly. On the contrary, when consumers buy flight tickets close to the day of departure,
paying much more than they would have paid earlier for the same ticket, they rarely feel a sense
of unfairness. Similarly, consumers care much less about fairness while paying much higher
prices for desirable seats at theaters or football stadiums, but often do find higher prices charged
for better airplane seats to be unfair. Given these examples of consumers’ differential judgments,
a further exploration of causes and consequences of price fairness is highly appropriate.
Contrary to common economic theories that justify price increases during times of
scarcity, or to mitigate excess demand in the market, empirical evidence suggests that sellers do
not necessarily increase prices even in such situations (Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). This
implies that sellers do consider the repercussions of price fairness. Because consumers often
resist buying at prices they consider unfair (Campbell 1999), reactions emerging from an unfair
price judgment can lead to reduced profits (Kachelmeier et al. 1991), consumer reprisals (Okun
1981), consumer boycotts (Goldman 1994), civil actions (Kaufmann et al. 1991), reduced sales
(Grover 1994), or reduced market shares due to damaged consumer trust and goodwill (Arrow
1973) .
Existing research provides three major conceptualizations to explain price fairness: dual
entitlement theory (Kahneman et al. 1986), distributive justice theory (Homans 1961; Rawls
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1971), and equity theory (Adams 1965). Dual entitlement theory suggests that market agents
acknowledge each other’s entitlement. Firms are entitled to an acceptable profit, and consumers
are entitled to an acceptable value. This entitlement is computed based on a reference price to the
buyer and a reference profit to the seller (Novoseltsev and Warlop 2002). Price changes that
affect any of these referred entitlements, either a decrease in consumers’ entitled value or an
increase in sellers’ entitled profit reduce price fairness (Kachelmeier et al. 1991; Kalapurakal et
al. 1991). Distributive justice theory highlights that parties involved in an exchange expect
proportionate reward from their investment in the exchange (Homans 1961). This theory predicts
that consumers would perceive a price as unfair if a seller uses it to leverage higher profit by
distorting the sense of proportional parity. Equity theory extends this idea to entail that any sense
of fairness arises from a comparison process to another standard which could be another person,
a class of people, an organization, another market, or the individual at a different point in time
(Jacoby 1976). Deliberating on this theory, Xia and Monroe (2005) show that of all the reference
standards used for comparisons (prices charged over time, or other retailers’ prices), prices paid
by other consumers have the largest effect on price fairness.
While Xia and Monroe (2005) did not specifically consider attribution theory, this
research addresses price fairness using arguments based on attribution theory. Attribution
thoughts direct consumers to infer sellers’ motives behind offered prices (Campbell 1999).
Consumers infer about a firm’s profit by evaluating a seller’s degree of control in the market.
Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003) use attribution theory to verify that stability of prices, degree
of control, and locus of causation affect price fairness. They argue that price changes due to
external or non-firm controlled factors generate greater price fairness (Vaidyanathan and
Aggarwal 2003).
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In summary, according to existing research, price fairness can be comparative, based on
references drawn from past prices, same or similar product prices, and transaction costs (Xia et
al. 2004). It is also evaluative and tends to be biased towards consumers’ self interests, which
attributes causes of unfairness more toward the seller (Kalapurakal et al. 1991). Price fairness
entails affective components in addition to cognitive evaluations (Bougie et al. 2003; Xia and
Monroe 2005). Cost justified price increases are perceived to be fair if the increase seems beyond
the control of the seller (Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003).
1.2.4.2 Price Magnitude
Price magnitude is a size estimation of the focal price (Thomas and Morwitz 2007). It is
a cognitive judgment that determines numerical interpretation of a focal price (Menon et al.
1997); i.e., how large a price is. Lynch et al. (1991) show that numerical judgments on a
response scale result from how the scale numbers are interpreted in the context of the price
stimuli. Such quantitative interpretations, referred to as price magnitude in this research, are an
outcome of conscious or automatic translation of an objective stimulus value into a subjective
size estimation (Adaval and Monroe 2002).
Price magnitude is a comparative judgment, where a focal price is compared to a
reference standard (Thomas et al. 2007). This reference standard could be constructed from
memory, which is known as an internal reference price, or it could be available externally during
price comparisons, which is known as an external or stimulus-based reference price (Mayhew
and Winer 1992, Niedrich et al. 2001). Price magnitude is found to be affected by internal and
external reference prices (Greenleaf 1995).
Cognitive processes that help decipher numbers, known as numerical cognition, explain
how people encode, interpret, and apply numbers while making judgments (Dehaene 1992).
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Research on numerical cognition has highlighted four important aspects of price magnitude
(Adaval and Monroe 2002; Coulter and Coulter 2005; Thomas and Morwitz 2009). First,
encoding and processing of price magnitudes can be conscious or automatic. A deliberate and
rational consideration of prices, as with conscious processing, or an automatic or non-conscious
processing of prices using peripheral cues such as color, sound, spokesperson, or layout, are
found to affect price magnitude (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Second, numerical stimuli are
generally encoded and stored in memory as magnitude representations, which are judgments of
size, arranged in analog format along a left to right number line, and may reproduce an exact
numerical value (e.g. 7) or an approximation of exact value (e.g., “large” or “big”) (Dehaene
1992). Third, to compare prices as quantitative numbers requires retrieval of referent standards
(Coulter and Coulter 2005; Greenleaf 1995; Xia et al. 2004). Fourth, comparative distances
between two prices are affected by factors such as computational difficulties (Thomas and
Morwitz 2009).
1.2.4.3 Price Expectation
Behavioral literature commonly defines expectations as judgments of the future, or
outcome assessments based on present or past information (Menon et al. 1997). Thus, price
expectations are predictions of future price. Price expectation is different than factual reports of
past or present prices (Menon et al. 1997). In customer satisfaction research, expectation is
defined as a possibility standard (Teas 1993). Price expectation is defined as judgment of a focal
price based on a comparison of the focal price with an internally generated expected price
(Kalyani and Yim 1992).
This research defines price expectation as a comparative judgment that determines
whether a focal price is less or more than an expected price. Though price expectation and price
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magnitude are both comparative judgments, price magnitude compares focal price to
contextually retrieved reference standards, whereas reference standards are constructed for price
expectation based on an anticipated price. A reference standard based on anticipation is not just a
summarization of contextual prices, but also involves assigning a probabilistic belief about how a
price is expected to occur in the future.
Availability-diagnosticity theory is used to explain price expectation (Menon et al. 1997).
Research shows that prior elicitation, availability of price information, repeated use of memory
retrieved prices, and habitual access of similar information influence price expectation (Menon et
al. 1997). In other words, greater availability of price information affects price expectation
positively. Diagnosticity implies that the more relevant and reliable a price is, the more expected
it becomes (Menon et al. 1997). Turnovsky (1970) uses an empirical model to explain the
formation of price expectation. He explains how extrapolative and adaptive mechanisms generate
price expectation as a weighted average of past price knowledge.
Delvecchio et al. (2007) show that promotion framing affects price expectation.
Promotion discounts framed as percentage-off or cents-off, generating varying degrees of
processing difficulty, affect price expectation (Delvecchio et al. 2007). Depth and frequency of
promotion are also found to influence price judgments (Kalyani and Yim 1992). Using heuristic
principles (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) and adaptation theory (Helson 1964), Kalyani and Yim
(1992) explain that frequently discounted prices lower the reference range, which gets adapted to
generate a new heuristic that lowers price expectations. Deeply discounted prices help consumers
transcend a zone of price insensitivity (Raman and Bass 1988), and generate a strong positive
transaction utility (Thaler 1985), which gets assimilated as low price expectation.
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Using assimilation and contrast theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961), Lichtenstein et al.
(1991) explain the U-shaped price expectation curve. This curve also explains how price
expectation gets updated.

Lichtenstein et al. (1991) show that a price inconsistent with

consumers’ reference frames is adapted completely, partially, or not at all. It is argued that
consumers’ expected price estimates rise when retailers’ reference prices are higher than
consumers’ initial expectations. When the reference prices seem implausible, price expectations
either stop rising or decline (Lichtenstein et al. 1991; Kopalle and Mullikin 2003).
In summary, price expectation is considered a comparative judgment, contingent on
factors such as reference prices (Lichtenstein et al. 1991), predicted prices (Menon et al. 1997),
price discounts (Kalyani and Yim 1992), and accessible prices (Menon et al. 1997). However, it
is important to note that although price expectation and price magnitude are comparative
judgments, they employ different reference standards. To judge price magnitude, the focal price
is compared to a reference standard either available in the context or retrieved from memory, but
price expectation is based on a reference standard constructed as an anticipated price. A
reference standard based on anticipation involves a probabilistic belief in further occurrence of
the reference price, which differs from simple integration of the contextual prices.
1.3

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS
Opportunities to raise new questions in price judgment research are far from exhausted.

Experimental results and empirical models suggest that price judgments depend on external cues
such as price discounts (Kalyani and Yim 1992), branding, price framings (Delvecchio et al.
2007), and reference prices (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Niedrich et al. 200; Rajendran
and Tellis 1994), but debate still exists on representations and the nature of price judgments
(Danziger and Segev 2006). A careful examination of existing price judgment research generates
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many interesting and unanswered questions. A few of those are proposed below, and will be
studied at depth in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
1.3.1

Research Question 1
Are price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation different constructs?

1.3.1.1 Motivations and Literature Review
During a broadcast (March 17, 2009), CNN highlighted a story about Java Street Café in
Dayton, Ohio, where the store owner implemented a pricing policy, somewhat common in many
European and Asian countries, that has the customer suggest a fair price. If the customer’s offer
is acceptable to the seller, the transaction is completed. This pricing practice places greater
emphasis than usual on customers’ judgments of fair price. This is one obvious example of
consumers using price fairness. Do they usually use it more than other judgments? This example
encourages further investigation of how consumers reach decisions about price fairness. In
particular buying contexts, do consumers use a specific price judgment or a combination of price
judgments? Do consumers seek more market-based information or use self-generated thoughts to
construct price judgments? If a pricing practice such as the one used at Java Street Café becomes
common enough that consumers start expecting more power in determining prices, would that
create a stronger role for price expectation than price fairness?
New technology such as search engines, shop bots, GPS-based market scanners, and
other mobile devices instantly informs consumers about prices available at nearby stores. In
these shopping environments, prices are the primary and salient buying cues (Grewal et al.
1998). When only price information is available, are consumers primed to use price magnitude
more than other price judgments? Knowing the degree to which consumers adopt or resist a

23

specific price judgment would provide valuable information about consumers’ shopping
behaviors. These examples demonstrate the need to address research question 1.
Finding differences between price judgments can help researchers understand
characteristics of price judgments, reasons why consumers utilize specific price judgments, and
major implications of these price judgments. Awareness about how choice tasks are performed
has answered questions such as preference reversals, choice under risk and uncertainty, causal
schemas in probability judgment, and context effects (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981), but trying to
understand why some choice tasks are performed in different ways has rarely been answered.
Though cognitive research has focused on understanding, developing, and predicting descriptive
and normative models of consumers’ decision making processes, inadequate focus has been
given to distinguish cognitive processes involved in various judgments (Einhorn and Hogarth
1981). This inadequacy is also prominent in price judgment research.
This research proposes that price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are
different constructs. Price fairness manifests affective and cognitive characteristics, price
magnitude reflects cognitive characteristics of price comparisons, and price expectation
highlights a predictive judgment. Extant research shows that consumers’ price judgments are
outcomes of distinct cognitive systems (Kamins et al. 2009). Numerical or non-numerical price
judgments, quantitative or qualitative price judgments, and cognitive or affective price
judgments signify tasks that reflect fundamentally different cognitive systems (Kamins et al.
2009). Medical research shows that human cognitions, formed from different mental systems,
generate variations in judgments (Kinzler and Spelke 2007). An application of these ideas in
pricing research leads to the following proposition.
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1.3.1.2 Proposition 1
While correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are different
constructs.
1.3.2

Research Question 2
What are the antecedents of price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation?

1.3.2.1 Motivations and Literature Review
Causal analysis emphasizes the need to determine a cause preceding a presumed effect
(Cook and Campbell 1979). For generating nomologicals (laws), Cronbach and Meehl (1955)
emphasize validating and predicting relationships between constructs. Studying relationships
between price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, determining factors that affect
these price judgments and understanding consequences of these price judgments can establish a
causal network among price judgments. Finding moderators helps establish a nomological net
(Baron and Kenny 1986). Moderators affect direction and strength of relationships between
independent (predictor) and dependent variables (Baron and Kenny 1986). Finding moderators
that affect price judgments differently supports the main objective of this research by
establishing conceptual distinctions of three price judgments.
A number of antecedents of price fairness are found in the pricing literature: a) reference
price (Bolton et al. 2003; Monroe et al. 1991; Winer 1986), which suggests the comparative
aspect of price fairness is primarily driven by a referred price; b) locus of control (Vaidyanathan
and Aggarwal 2003), which suggests that prices determined by factors outside the seller’s control
are perceived to be fairer than prices controlled by the seller; c) consumers’ estimates of past
prices, competitors’ prices, producers’ costs, and associated profits (Bolton et al. 2003); d) selfinterest bias (Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994; Maxwell 2002; Xia et al. 2004), which means that
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the disadvantaged party in a transaction receives more price unfairness; e) perceived motive of
the seller (Campbell 1999), which indicates that cost- justified pricing, social-goal-oriented
pricing, and prices exploiting market conditions affect price fairness; and f) size, scale, and
mode of sellers’ operations (Gielissen et al. 2008), which find that target market size, wealth, and
perceived size of sellers may influence price fairness.
Campbell (1999) found that a firm’s reputation moderates the impact of inferred motive
on price fairness. Reputable sellers are given the benefit of the doubt when they change prices,
but skepticism looms large for price changes made by less reputable sellers. Extant research has
also identified other factors that moderate price fairness (Xia et al. 2004):

a) transaction

situations; b) types of market agents involved; c) trust and strength of relationships between
buyers and sellers; d) consumers’ existing knowledge and beliefs about offered prices; and e)
customer satisfaction. Consumers’ perceptions of who and what controls prices have consistently
been found to influence price fairness (Campbell 1999; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). This
research tries to understand the effect of locus of control on price fairness.
Major antecedents of price magnitude are contextual factors (Adaval and Monroe 2002).
Contextual antecedents applicable to price magnitude include range of values (Ostrom and
Upshaw 1968), internal standards (Briesch et al. 1997; Kardes 1986; Lynch et al. 1991),
cognitive effort (Wathieu and Bertini 2007), and levels of consciousness and automaticity
(Adaval and Monroe 2002; Coulter and Coulter 2005). In particular, cognitive effort (Shugan
1980), ambiguous or emotionally charged choice contexts (Johnson and Puto 1987; Luce et al.
1997), involvement, motivation, arousal, elaboration, and attention have been found to influence
price magnitude (Wathieu and Bertini 2007). Memory plays a significant role in retrieving and
constructing contextual prices (Dehane 1992). In general, price information in memory is
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represented as a magnitude in high-low terms, rather than the actual numerical digits, which
explains why consumers have poor recollection of actual prices (Dehane 1992). In addition,
diagnosticity of available information (Herr et al. 1991) and capacity of memory are also found
to influence processing speed which determines the numerical differences between prices
(Thomas and Moritz 2009).
Expectation formation and its use are important issues in consumer research (Oliver and
Winer 1987). How information is used, from memory or from the external environment,
influences price expectation (Menon et al. 1997). Using an accessibility-diagnosticity framework
representing available mental resources, existing research finds that regularity (Menon 1993),
frequency of retrieved information (Burton and Blair 1991), estimation strategy employed (Blair
and Burton 1987), rate of occurrence (Burton and Blair 1991), alternative information sources
considered (Menon et al. 1995; Scwarz et al. 1985), relative importance of attributes (price) in
the judgment task, and levels of effort involved (Sujan 1985) influence price expectation.
Judgment environment, defined in this research as a memory- or stimulus-based context,
is assumed to moderate effects of focal prices on price judgments. Whether contextual prices are
retrieved from memory, as in memory-based contexts, or externally provided to the consumers,
as in stimulus-based contexts, are found to affect price judgments (Biswas and Blair 1991;
Niedrich et al. 2001). Extreme prices are more salient (Fiske and Taylor 1991) and, thus, are
more easily retrieved than intermediate values (Tversky and Kahnemann 1973); less-salient
intermediate values would be easily retrieved only in a stimulus-based (externally provided)
context. Because information use, whether memory-or stimulus-based, influences price
expectation (Menon et al. 1995), judgment environment is likely to affect price expectation.
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Mood affects human judgments, including price judgments (Hsu and Liu 1998; Martin
and Tesser 1992). Mood can bias evaluations and judgments (Hsu and Liu 1998) in such a way
that transaction value, discount value, and judgment of an offer price are influenced in a mood
congruent direction (Clark and Isen 1982; Gardner 1985; Johnson and Tversky 1983). Mood
enhances accessibility and retrieval of mood congruent thoughts that serves as a retrieval cue for
judgment objects (Clark and Isen 1982; Isen et al. 1978). Positive mood extracts consistent,
positive-valenced material from memory, while negative mood blocks memory retrieval, or
enhances negative-valenced material (Hsu and Liu 1998). This provides an interesting
proposition for pricing research; specifically, that mood may moderate the effect of focal price
on price judgments.
Given the intricacies of price judgments, it is unsurprising that a person’s evaluative toolbox includes several mechanisms. Drawing on these different mechanisms, a person may depend
on the fluency or the speed with which information about a target is processed (Winkielman et
al. 2002). High fluency is associated with positive affect, resulting in a favorable or positive
evaluation as reflected in judgments and other psychological processes (Winkielman et al. 2002).
A fluently processed price may result in favorable price judgments, thereby highlighting the
moderation role of processing fluency on price judgments.
1.3.2.2 Proposition 2
Locus of control is an antecedent of price fairness. Judgment environment, mood, and
processing fluency moderate effects of antecedents on price judgments.
1.3.3

Research Question 3
How do price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations affect purchase intent?

28

1.3.3.1 Motivations and Literature Review
Research on how price fairness affects behavioral intentions has produced contradictory
findings. While Urbany et al. (1989) find no impact of price fairness on purchase decisions (due
to high switching cost) in the banking industry, Campbell (1999) finds that consumers draw
inferences about sellers’ motives for price changes, and shows a positive relationship between
price fairness and likelihood of buying. Price fairness affects consumer preference for firms
(Feinberg et al. 2003), customer satisfaction (Martins 1995), purchase intentions, and complaints
(Campbell 1999; Huppertz et al. 1978). Xia et al. (2004) found that price fairness influences
purchase intentions, complaints, and negative word of mouth through the mediating factors of
product value and intensity of negative emotions.
In consumer research, price expectation has been found to influence effectiveness of
promotions (Anderson and Salisbury 2003; Winer 1986), purchase quantity (Neslin et al. 1985),
product and service quality (Meyer 1981), and brand switching (Hardie et al. 1993). Pricing
research finds that price expectation influences market-size, brand-shares, and segment sizes
(Menon et al. 1997). Research on consumer search and brand choice shows that price
expectations influence consumer choice and search behavior (Swan 1972).
1.3.3.2 Proposition 3
Price fairness and price expectation have positive effects on purchase intent. Price
magnitude has a negative effect on purchase intent.
1.4

EXPECTED RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
Marr (1982) conceptualized three levels for understanding cognitive theories: a) at the

highest level, theories are intended to find relationships with other theories; b) at an intermediate
level, theories try to explain cognitive and perceptual processes; and c) at the lowest level,
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theories describe neurobiological operations to better understand the second level perceptual
systems. Judgment and decision making research focuses on intermediate and highest level
goals. This research contributes to intermediate and highest level goals of exploring cognitive
process in price judgments. It also intends to understand how price judgments differ from each
other, and how they individually affect purchase intent.
Understanding differences among three important price judgments will allow researchers
a more realistic and integrative framework for studying price judgments. From a practical
standpoint we find that consumers employ all or at least some combination of these price
judgments that influence their purchase intent. Therefore an integrated approach towards
examining these price judgments in the same context would add realism and provide better
explanations for price judgments. Price judgments studied in segregation are subjected to
different interpretations as they may ascribe to different areas in conceptual domains. For
example, a commonly cited judgment variable, price attractiveness, has often been interpreted
from a price fairness perspective, a price magnitude perspective, or even from a price expectation
perspective. This would generate very different interpretations based on the type of price
judgment considered in the study. However if price attractiveness is considered to be a
multidimensional judgment, with components from price fairness as well as price magnitude
influencing this judgment, it could provide better conceptual clarity. Hence, knowing how these
price judgments differ, interact, and impact downstream choice processes could provide
important managerial information.
1.5

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation contains three chapters. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on a common

theme of price judgments, but explore one or more different research questions pertaining to the
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proposed price judgments. Employing methodologies appropriate for each research question,
these two chapters provide theoretical and empirical support for proposed hypotheses. The
following section provides brief summaries of the main ideas in each chapter.
1.5.1

Chapter 1
Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation topic, classifies and defines price fairness, price

magnitude, and price expectation as three important price judgments, proposes three possible
research questions, articulates rationale for studying those research questions, provides
background literature for each, and provides a framework for this dissertation.
1.5.2

Chapter 2
Chapter 2 proposes specific hypotheses to answer each research question, and provides

empirical support for the hypotheses. This chapter tests the hypothesis that price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectations are unique judgments. It also explores the effects of focal
price, locus of control, judgment environment, and judgment/intent order on three price
judgments and purchase intent. Using data from two pretests, this chapter generates and validates
necessary scales for measuring price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation. Next,
using the validated scales, an experiment is undertaken and a structural equation model and
repeated measures ANOVA are employed to test the hypotheses.
1.5.3

Chapter 3
Chapter 3 continues with the main objective of testing whether price fairness, price

magnitude, and price expectation are distinct constructs; however Chapter 3 extends Chapter 2
by considering the effects of focal price, judgment environment, mood, and processing fluency
on price judgments, purchase intent, and anger. A pretest reports the findings for a new price
expectation measures and an experiment is conducted to test the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 2: TOWARD EMPIRICALLY DIFFERENTIATING AMONG PRICE
FAIRNESS, PRICE MAGNITUDE, AND PRICE EXPECTATION
2.1

INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this chapter is to distinguish price fairness, price magnitude, and

price expectation as distinct price judgments. Understanding differences between the three price
judgments would help researchers explore different relationships among the price judgments and
understand how each price judgment influences consumers’ purchase intent differently. This
chapter explains the effects of focal price, locus of control, judgment environment, and
judgment/intent order on the three price judgments and on purchase intent.
This chapter contains: a) relevant construct definitions; b) hypotheses and related
literature to address research questions discussed in Chapter 1; c) two pretests to develop and
validate price judgment scales; d) analysis of the data using structural equation modeling and
repeated measures ANOVA; and e) discussions of the main findings and their implications and
limitations.
2.2

DEFINITIONS OF CONSTRUCTS

2.2.1

Focal Price
Focal price is a target price on which consumer judgments of price fairness, price

magnitude, price expectation, purchase intent, and anger are based.
2.2.2

Price Fairness
Price fairness is a consumer judgment of how just, reasonable, acceptable, or satisfactory

the focal price is (Xia and Monroe 2005).
2.2.3

Price Magnitude
Price magnitude is a consumer judgment of the numerical size of a focal price (Thomas

and Morwitz 2007). Consumers judge how large, big or huge a focal price is.
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2.2.4

Price Expectation
Price expectation is a consumer judgment of how expected the focal price is.

2.2.5

Locus of Control
Weiner’s (1974) attribution theory identifies locus of control as a cause of action or

outcome. Locus of control determines whether the location of a cause (control) is ascribed as
internal or external to an actor (Rotter 1954). In this study, internal control implies a situation
when prices are controlled by the retailers, and external control implies a condition when market
factors, external to the retailers, determine prices.
Rotter’s social learning theory describes locus of control as an individual belief that
locates causes of events (Rotter 1954). Some people, driven by internal locus of control, believe
that they have substantial influence on their lives, actions, and outcomes, whereas some,
influenced by external locus of control, believe that they are relatively powerless and have little
control over outcomes (McCarty and Shrum 2001).
To explain the reasons behind peoples’ actions, Heider (1944) and Weiner (1974)
introduced attribution theory, which adds dimensions such as stability and controllability to
Rotter’s theory. In psychology, locus of control is applied widely in areas such as obesity
(Saltzer 1982), mental health (Wood and Letak 1982), gender differences (Schultz and Schultz
2005), and cross-cultural differences (Shiraev and Levy 2004). In managerial decision making,
locus of control explains how managers attribute reasons for organizational success (Chebat et al.
1992). In marketing, Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003) use attribution theory to highlight the
roles of causality, controllability, and stability in explaining price fairness. Maxwell (2002) uses
locus of control to explain how consumers attribute reasons for determining their rule-based
price fairness.
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2.2.6

Judgment /Intent Order
Judgment/intent order denotes the order in which consumers use judgment tasks or

purchase intent tasks to evaluate a focal price. Behavioral decision theory shows that consumers’
constructed preferences depend on levels of elicitation (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). Studies
demonstrating preference reversals show systematic differences between choice and preference
despite identical elicitation (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). González-Vallejo et al. (1994) find
that choice order is important for judgment tasks that consist of numeric and non numeric
probabilities. Van De Kaa (2004) demonstrates how preference is contingent on choice context
and on the order in which choice options are presented.
2.2.7

Judgment Environment
Price judgments are context dependant (Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989). The context in

which consumers make judgments is known as the judgment environment. Consumers evaluate a
focal price against a reference standard (Biswas and Blair 1991; Niedrich et al. 2001). How the
reference prices are retrieved in a judgment environment influences price judgment (Lichtenstein
and Bearden 1989; Niedrich et al.2001). Judgment environment describes the source of reference
price information and is conceptualized in two ways: a) memory-based context; and b) stimulusbased context (Biswas and Blair 1991).
In memory-based contexts, consumers retrieve reference prices from memory. Memorybased contexts generate internal reference price as a single price, multiple prices, or as a range of
values (Monroe 1984). Researchers have conceptualized internal reference prices in many ways,
such as fair price, lowest or highest price, normal market price (Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989),
or average or expected market price (Emory 1970), but they hardly agree on the type that is
most important or prevalent (Jacobson and Obermiller 1990). Two important cognitive
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mechanisms, the numerosity heuristic and the availability heuristic explain how consumers
retrieve reference price information from memory (Ofir et al. 2008). Numerosity heuristic refers
to the number of sample prices that consumers are able to retrieve (Pelham et al. 1994), while
availability heuristic refers to the ease at which consumers can recall price information (Tversky
and Kahneman 1973).
In stimulus-based contexts, consumers rely on externally provided reference prices to
judge a focal price (Biswas and Blair 1991; Grewal et al. 1998; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989;
Lichtenstein et al. 1991). External reference prices vary in how they are framed (e.g., “Was $x,
Now $y,” “List price/current price,” “Their price/our price,”). Stimulus-based context can be
provided through multiple ways including retail channels, advertising, catalogs, search engines,
and price lists. In stimulus-based contexts, retailers use comparative pricing strategies to create a
perception of higher savings or higher values (Biswas and Blair 1991).
The effect of judgment environment on price judgments are explained using three main
theories: a) adaptation-level theory (Helson 1964); b) assimilation-contrast theory (Sherif and
Hovland 1964); and c) transaction-utility theory (Thaler 1985). Adaptation-level theory assumes
that contextual prices are integrated into a single reference price, as reference standard against
which a focal price is judged high, fair, or acceptable (Biswas and Blair 1991). Assimilationcontrast theory suggests that focal price is assimilated and accepted when it is within an
individual’s latitude of acceptable prices, and contrasted when it falls outside that range of
acceptable prices (Monroe and Petroshius 1981). Transaction-utility theory predicts that the
difference between a focal price and the internal reference price, known as transaction utility of
an offer, affects price judgment. External reference price is intended to increase consumers’
internal reference prices, so that transaction utility increases (Biswas and Blair 1991).
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2.2.8

Purchase Intent
Purchase intent is defined as the degree to which a consumer is willing to buy a product

(Dodds et al. 1991). It represents consumer intent or beliefs, rather than actual choice.
2.3

HYPOTHESES

2.3.1

Hypothesis 1
Price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, as defined in Chapter 1, are

distinct price judgments because of differences in underlying cognitive and affective processes.
Price fairness is a combination of affective and cognitive processes (Xia et al. 2004), but price
magnitude and price expectation reflect only cognitive processes. Dual-entitlement theory
(Kahneman et al. 1986), equity theory (Adams 1965), and distributive-justice theory (Homans
1961) suggest that consumers do not rely only on the magnitude aspect of prices. In addition to
magnitude comparisons, consumers activate ethics, norms, or beliefs while judging fairness of
focal prices, leading to evaluative price judgments that reflect affective dimensions (Xia et al.
2004). Also, when cognitive evaluations of focal prices are difficult, consumers rely on feelings
to judge focal prices (Liu and Soman 2008). Therefore, it can be argued that price fairness is an
evaluative judgment constructed using both cognition and affect (Xia and Monroe 2005).
However, consumers’ affective thoughts are unlikely to dominate their numerical
cognition, a cognitive process applied to compare numbers. Size estimation, reflected in price
magnitude, is dependent on cognitive elaboration (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Literature on
numerical cognition suggests that price magnitude involves cognitive comparison of a focal price
to a referred anchor (Coulter and Coulter 2005; Lynch et al. 1991; Thomas and Morwitz 2009).
This implies that consumers locate a focal price within a set of ordered, contextual prices to
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determine price magnitude. Hence, price magnitude is considered a cognitive, comparative
judgment.
Price expectation, as defined in Chapter 1, is a similarity judgment which combines two
judgment stages: prediction and comparison. At the first stage, consumers use predictive
judgment to construct an expected price, which they use to judge the proximity of a focal price.
Price magnitude and price expectation are both comparative judgments, but they differ in
how they generate the reference standards. Price expectation depends on belief about future
prices. Price magnitude creates its reference anchor by integrating available, contextual prices.
The cognitive process of integration is different from prediction (Neimeyer et al. 1983).
Therefore price expectation differs from price magnitude.
Since it incorporates prediction, price expectation is an inductive inference, but price
magnitude depends on a standard available at the moment, rather than on a possible or predicted
anchor. Hence price magnitude is a deductive inference, different than the inductive process
found in price expectation.
Price expectation and price magnitude, which are cognitive in nature, differ from price
fairness, which is a combination of cognitive and affective processes. Hence:
H1: While correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are different
constructs.
2.3.2

Hypothesis 2
Price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation depend on comparisons to

reference standards. Consumers perceive any focal price lower than the reference standard as fair
and low in magnitude, and any price higher than the reference standard to be unfair and high in
magnitude (Bechwati et al. 2005; Xia and Monroe 2005). As focal price increases, price fairness
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declines and price magnitude increases. So price fairness represents a negatively sloped curve,
and price magnitude represents a positively sloped curve. Price expectation compares focal price
to an anticipated price. Because consumers believe extreme prices are less frequent, price
expectations are low at two extreme (high and low) focal prices, and higher at the mean focal
price, generating an inverted U-shaped curve. The predicted patterns of the three price judgments
are hypothesized below and represented in Figure 2.1.
H2: (a) Price fairness is a negatively sloped function of focal price; (b) price magnitude is
a positively sloped function of focal price; and (c) price expectation displays an
inverted U-shaped relationship with focal price.

Price judgment
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7

5

3
focal price

1
low

Price fairness

mid

Price magnitude

high

Price expectation

Figure 2.1 Hypothesized relationships of price judgments to focal price
2.3.3

Hypothesis 3
Anderson's (1981) information integration theory illustrates that overt responses to focal

stimuli are outcomes of intermediate judgment stages (Niedrich et al. 2001). Research in
psychology concurs that judgment is strongly related to choice (Petty et al. 1994), and that the
effect of stimuli on behavioral intentions in mediated by judgments (Siu 2007). Pricing research
has established that price judgments affect willingness to purchase, a type of behavioral intention
(Jacoby and Olson 1977; Kahneman et al.1986; Kalapurakal et al.1991) and choice (Winer
1988). Maxwell (2002) suggests that price fairness mediates the effect of focal price on
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willingness to purchase. Focal prices also influence purchase intent through price magnitude
(Coulter and Coulter 2005).
However, price expectation is less diagnostic (Helgeson and Beatty 1985). Analyzing
diagnosticity of price judgments based on levels of attention, meaning orientation, and
processing orientation, Helgeson and Beaty (1985) posit that price expectation operates on the
lower end of the processing continuum, signifying non-evaluative, low-attention, and lowresource based price judgment. Because expectation-based judgments are less diagnostic,
possessing lower activation strength (Helgeson and Beatty 1985), price expectation would have
no mediating impact on subsequent purchase decisions. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: (a) Price fairness and (b) price magnitude mediate the effect of focal price on
purchase intent; (c) price expectation does not mediate the effect of focal price on
purchase intent.
2.3.4

Hypothesis 4
Consumers’ feelings affect their evaluations (Schwarz 1997). Affect, as an information

processing source, plays a vital role in evaluative judgments (Schwarz and Clore 1996; Wyer and
Carlstone 1979). Positive feelings lead to favorable evaluative judgments, whereas negative
feelings lead to unfavorable evaluations (Pham 1998; Schwarz 1997; Winkielman et al. 2003).
Studies also show that affective judgments are perceptually stronger than cognitive evaluations
(Edwards 1990). Attitude research also finds that impact of affective attitude on judgment is
stronger than cognitive attitude (Fazio et al. 1982).
Accessibility of affective and cognitive components, the speed with which an evaluative
component is accessed from memory, influences subsequent behavior and decision making in an
affect consistent manner; that is, quickly accessed components affect behavioral intentions most

39

strongly (Fazio et al. 1982). Extant research also supports affect primacy, which shows that in a
similar context, affect components are more readily available than cognitive components
(Verplanken et al. 1998), because a) cognition follows affect (Isen 1984); that is, affective
thoughts are more fundamental, basic, and more likely than is cognition (Bargh et al. 1989;
Zajonc 1980); b) cognition depends on comparison to referent conditions, making it resourcedependant, and slower than affect (Verplanken et al. 1998); c) affect is not verified for truth or
accuracy, but cognition relies on comparative assessment, which can be judged for accuracy
(Verplanken et al. 1998); and d) affective judgments are often irrevocable, because people tend
not to question their own feelings (Zajonc 1980). Research shows that consumers place more
confidence in affect-based evaluations than in cognitive judgments (Edwards 1990). But
Edwards (1990) also shows that cognition and affect may jointly influence consumer decisions
(Edwards 1990). It is reasonable to argue that compared to cognitive price judgments, affectbased price judgments will have a larger impact on purchase intent. Because price fairness is an
affective judgment, its effect on purchase intent will be stronger than price magnitude. This leads
to the following hypothesis:
H4: Price fairness has a stronger effect on purchase intent than does price magnitude.
2.3.5

Hypothesis 5
Affect primacy theory suggests that affective reactions may involve minimal stimulus

contribution and have limited or no cognitive processing, and shows that response time for
affective judgment is significantly less than cognitive judgments (Zajonc 1980). Emotion rich
judgments, outside of cognitive awareness, cloud impressions and generate judgments which are
prompt and quick (Murphy and Zajonc 1993).
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Of the three price judgments considered here, price fairness is the only price judgment
with affective characteristics. Price fairness is expected to be quicker than price magnitude and
price expectation, which require cognition. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H5: Response times are faster for price fairness than for (a) price magnitude and (b) price
expectation.
2.3.6

Hypothesis 6
It has been argued that individual price judgments are different from each other. Thus,

judgment environment (i.e., memory-based or stimulus-based context) is expected to influence
price judgments differently. In particular, price expectation, which involves a predicted
(expected) price, would differ if the predicted value differs under memory-based and stimulusbased contexts.
As defined, price expectation is determined by comparing a focal price to an expected
price. Price expectation entails two judgment processes: a prediction and a comparison. Although
the comparison process should not change between the two conditions, the process of prediction
would differ between memory- and stimulus-based contexts primarily because a) the task for
generating a predicted price is easier under stimulus-based than under memory-based context
(Helgeson and Beatty 1987); b) with an easier task for predicting a price, consumers show
greater confidence and accuracy under stimulus-based than under memory-based context
(Delvecchio et al. 2007); and c) in a memory-based context, with lower confidence in the
accuracy of the predicted price, consumers will place lower weights on the contextually retrieved
price (Delvecchio et al. 2007).
Therefore, in a memory-based context, a systematic bias towards the focal price shifts the
expected price (referred anchor) closer to the focal price, and thereby results in weaker contrasts
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(Delvecchio et al. 2007), as compared to a stimulus-based context, when all the contextual prices
are available, and consumers are able to eliminate any systematic biases. We expect larger
contrasts from the focal price under stimulus-based contexts.
Other price judgments would be less vulnerable to systematic biases due to retrieval
errors. For example, price fairness is mainly influenced by affect, thus the judgment environment
should not influence price fairness. Price magnitude is a comparative judgment, and does not
involve a predictive process. Therefore, it should not be different across memory- and stimulusbased contexts. This leads to the following hypothesis, which is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
H6: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by an interaction
between focal price and judgment environment; (b) price expectation is lower in a
stimulus-based context than in a memory-based context at low and high focal prices,
but does not differ across contexts at the mid focal price.
Price expectation
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Figure 2.2 Hypothesized effects of judgment environment on price expectation
2.3.7

Hypothesis 7
Locus of control ascribes cause to an action or an outcome (Rotter 1954). Using

attribution-affect-action theory, Schmidt and Weiner (1988) find that reasons attributed to
controllable causes produce anger, and uncontrollable causes generate pity. Their findings also
highlight that while attributing causes, locus of control generates affect, which influences
judgment. Weiner et al. (1974) also find consistent results that locus of control affects feelings
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and affective states. Green et al. (1994) use ego-serving bias theory, which highlights that
internal locus of control generates affect to satisfy ego-serving responses.
Consumers’ derived reasons for a retailer’s offer price affect price fairness, because it is
an affective judgment (Campbell 2002). In addition to monetary sacrifice (economic rule) of
price fairness, Campbell (2002) finds that social acceptability (social rule) of price fairness is
also an important determinant of willingness to purchase. Similar views resonate in Xia and
Monroe (2005) who find price fairness to be driven by a combination of affective and cognitive
calculations.
Consumers consider focal prices fair when sellers are perceived to have little or no
control over prices (Campbell 1999; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). High prices may not
necessarily result in lower price fairness, because consumers’ inferred reasons of locus of control
may provide support to the retailer. The same price could create low price fairness if consumers
suspect that the seller is exerting control. Because locus of control affects affective judgment, it
is expected to influence price fairness, and not price magnitude or price expectation, in an affectconsistent manner. This leads to the following hypothesis, illustrated in Figure 2.3.
H7: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by locus of control;
(b) price fairness is higher under external control than under internal control.
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Figure 2.3 Hypothesized effects of locus of control on price judgments
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2.3.8

Hypothesis 8
Determining practical relevance of price judgments requires discerning whether price

fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are outcomes of directed elicitations, or are
naturally undertaken in actual decision-making contexts. One way to address this question would
be to compare responses between instances when price judgment precedes or follows a purchase
intent task, henceforth referred to as judgment/intent order. In other words, changing
judgment/intent order could suggest which price judgments occur naturally. Before consumers
commit to a purchase intent task, they would undertake a price judgment if it is naturally
occurring. Identical price judgment responses, irrespective of judgment/intent order, are
indicative of judgments that take place without conscious priming. If price judgments depend on
experimenter induced elicitation process, mean price judgments are expected to differ when
judgment/intent order changes.
Price expectation may be affected by judgment/intent order. Cognitive phenomenology
theory suggests that cognitive and affective components are the two most natural outcomes while
judging a focal object. But constructing a prediction and using it as a judgment standard of
comparison requires effort and deliberation (Clore 1992).Such construction is plausible only
when consumers are primed for it. Lacking confidence in knowledge about actual market-prices,
consumers are unlikely to adopt price expectation naturally. Hence this leads to the following
hypothesis illustrated in Figure 2.4.
H8: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by
judgment/intent order; (b) price expectation is lower under judgment first than under
intent first condition.
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Figure 2.4 Hypothesized effects of judgment/intent order on price judgments
2.4

METHODOLOGY
Structural equation modeling and repeated measures ANOVA have been used in this

research to test the proposed hypotheses. Structural equation model (SEM) determines viability
of the measurement model, and predicts path coefficients between latent constructs. SEM finds
correlations between latent constructs, and determines measurement errors and residual errors
(Kline 1998). Even in the presence of collinearity, SEM estimates regression coefficients with
multiple dependent and independent variables. SEM uses confirmatory factor analysis to
diagnose unidimensionality of constructs. In addition to computing measurement errors, SEM
allows multiple model comparisons, or suggests alternative models by assessing relative model
fits (Kline 1998).
A structural model proposed in this chapter predicts the effects of three focal prices (low,
medium, and high) on purchase intent, mediated by price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation. In this model, locus of control is assumed to influence price fairness, and
judgment/intent order is expected to influence price expectation. Additionally, judgment
environment is conceptualized to moderate the effect of focal prices on price expectation. To test
for moderation, a multi-group approach is employed. Changes in path coefficients (of the same
path) across groups suggest a moderating effect of the grouping factor (Barron and Kenney
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1986). In addition, analysis based on repeated measures ANOVA is also performed to determine
empirical support for the proposed hypotheses.
2.4.1

Pretests

2.4.1.1 Pretest 1
2.4.1.1.1 Purpose
Price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, and purchase intent have been
measured in this study using multi-item scales. Researchers have used open-ended questions or
consumers’ self-reported estimates as measures of price judgments (Grewal et al 1998;
Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989). Measures generated from statements such as “Give us an
estimate of a price you consider to be high, low, fair, expected etc.” have been used in past
studies to assess various price judgments (Biswas and Blair 1991). These measures at best
capture price predictions. These measures neither represent a specific price judgment nor do they
distinguish between various price judgments.
Research shows that price judgments are encoded and retained in memory as nonnumeric evaluations (Dehane 1995). Questions asking precise numerical estimates to represent
various price judgments are expected to be flawed. Unavailability of non-numerical scales to
uniquely measure price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation required developing
new, reliable and valid scales. The new scales should allow researchers to measure price
judgments rather than their reported predictions. A major challenge in developing an accurate
price judgment scale is finding words that would elicit accurate price judgments.
Purchase intent is also studied in this research as an outcome of price judgments. This
scale is adopted from an existing willingness to buy scale (Grewal etal. 1998) and adjusted for
present context. The purchase intent measure used in this research consists of three items with
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nine scale points. Between two end points of very low to very high, the scale items were: “The
likelihood that I would purchase the car polish at the given price is….,” “The probability that I
would consider buying the car polish at the given price is….,” and “My willingness to buy the car
polish at the given price is….”
Surprisingly, no research has developed multi-items measures for the three price
judgments. Therefore, two pretests were conducted to develop scales for price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectation. Standard scale development procedures were employed to test
the psychometric properties of the multi-item measures.
2.4.1.1.2 Sample
In pretest 1, participants were undergraduate business students at Louisiana State
University who were awarded with participatory credit for taking part in this study. Pretest 1 was
conducted over two weeks, and generated a sample of 48 students. After adjusting for
respondents who used the scales incorrectly or provided incomplete answers, the final sample
consisted of 43 respondents.
2.4.1.1.3 Design and Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a behavioral computer lab, under controlled settings.
Each study session was one hour in duration, and was conducted at approximately the same time
of the day. Respondents were instructed to carefully follow the instructions on a computer screen
and respond to questions on the screen by using an attached keyboard. E-prime was used to
develop and execute this pretest, which allowed response time for each question to be recorded
unobtrusively. To control for possible external distractions such as noise or environmental
interference, each respondent was placed in a small, individual cubicle in the lab.
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Pretest 1 used nine-point, semantic differential scales with ten items for price fairness,
nine items for price magnitude, and nine items for price expectations. Each price judgment item
was chosen based on existing literature review and a list of synonyms generated that resembled
the underlying price judgment construct. Bipolar antonyms, chosen to represent a price judgment
construct, served as anchors on respective scales. The price magnitude scale was reverse ordered,
while the price fairness and price expectation scales were positively directed, to give the scales
consistent meaning. This was considered necessary to reduce subjects’ interpretational difficulty
(i.e., a higher value on price magnitude scale suggests a lower price fairness or price
expectation). To further reduce incorrect use of scale items, reversed scales were intentionally
avoided. The judgment-priming word was underlined in bold font once in the question and again
as end-point anchors on each scale. Each scale displayed nine scale points below each sentence.
The only word that differed on each item was the thought-priming word in each sentence and the
two bipolar anchors. A typical question is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 An example of a price judgment scale item (price fairness)
Price Fairness -1
How fair [thought priming word] is the price of this card reader?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
very
very
fair
unfair

An image of a fictitious car polish was displayed on the initial screen, to provide realism
to the context. Product choice was based on results from an earlier pretest where car polish,
among other products, generated the least product knowledge and least price confidence among
subjects. Product knowledge and price confidence has been found to influence price judgments
(Rao and Sieben 1992; Thomas and Menon 2007). To minimize potential confounds, car polish
was chosen for this pretest.
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Participants were provided nine contextual prices (i.e., reference prices that are not
judged) and three focal prices (i.e., prices that are judged). The nine contextual prices were:
$15.00, $16.25, $18.00, $19.50, $21.00, $22.50, $24.00, $25.50, and $27.00. The three focal
prices were $8.99, $20.99, and $32.99. Focal prices and the contextual prices followed a uniform
distribution and were held constant for all participants. Throughout the experiment, the range,
mean, and distributions of the contextual prices were kept constant. The three focal prices were
chosen so that the low focal price was lower than all contextual prices, the mid focal price was at
the mean of the contextual prices, and the high focal price was higher than all the contextual
prices. The three focal prices (high, medium and low) were equidistant from each other and from
the contextual prices.
To create the memory-based context, the nine prices were randomly chosen and
individually presented on nine screens. In the stimulus-based context, all nine prices were
simultaneously displayed on the screen. After all contextual prices were displayed on screen,
subjects were shown a single (focal) price and asked to provide their price judgments (i.e., 28
measurement items) and purchase intent responses (i.e., three measurement items). Once a focal
price was evaluated, and responses were collected, the same process was repeated for the two
other focal prices.
2.4.1.1.4 Results
In order to allow for standard reliability tests with a minimum number of items, the goal
of the pretests was to identify four items each for price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation. The initial items along with the final items retained are provided in appendix (Table
A.2.1 - A.2.3).
Each scale was subjected to several iterations of scale reliability tests. In each iteration
the least effective item of each scale was identified and eliminated from subsequent iterations.
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Various diagnostic criteria for testing scale reliability were considered. Items resulting in largest
gain in alpha (if item deleted), along with other criteria, such as corrected item-total correlation
(at least 0.7), squared multiple correlations (0.5 or more), and inter-item correlations (at least
0.5) were given due considerations. The same approach was adopted for price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectation. Appendix Table A.2.4 shows items dropped for price fairness,
price magnitude, and price expectations at each iteration. The final scale reliability and scale
items retained are also shown in Table A.2.4.
The twelve selected items (four for each of the three price judgments), were subjected to
factor analysis; the rotated component matrix and number of eigenvalues greater than one
produce two orthogonal factors (Table 2.2) instead of the expected three factor solution.

Table 2.2 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix, pretest 1)
Items
Fair
Reasonable
Satisfactory
Acceptable
Attractive
Desirable
Appealing
Good
Expected
Predictable
Common
Ordinary

Factor1
0.797
0.812
0.829
0.819
0.927
0.890
0.900
0.751
0.207
0.103
0.050
0.103

Factor2
0.408
0.418
0.269
0.318
-0.089
-0.075
-0.042
0.206
0.830
0.829
0.833
0.845

Although the four items of the price expectation load on a single factor, the rotated factor
loadings suggest weak separation of price magnitude and price fairness items. Unexpectedly, the
price magnitude and price fairness items loaded on the same factor. The two factors shown in
Table 2.2 indicate the need for further scale refinement which is conducted in the second pretest.
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2.4.1.2 Pretest 2
2.4.1.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of this pretest was to refine the price magnitude measure.
2.4.1.2.2 Sample
For pretest 2, undergraduate business students at Louisiana State University were used as
study participants. These students were awarded participatory credits for taking part in this study.
This student group is familiar with the facility and with computer-run studies. Pretest 2 generated
a sample of 111 students. After adjusting for incomplete or incorrect responses, 102 respondents
could be used for this pretest analysis.
2.4.1.2.3 Design and Procedure
This pretest followed identical procedures as pretest 1. This pretest used nine-point,
semantic differential scales with four items for price fairness, four items for price expectation,
and three items for purchase intent; all these items were retained from pretest 1. As in pretest 1,
ten items were chosen for price magnitude out of a 15-word synonyms list that were deemed to
be close in meaning to price magnitude. Bipolar antonyms served as scale anchors. The price
magnitude scale was reverse-ordered, while price fairness and price expectation scales were
positively directed to give the scales consistent meaning, and to reduce subjects’ interpretational
errors. As in pretest 1, the judgment-priming word, underlined and in bold font, was displayed
once in the question, and was an end-point anchor on each scale.
An image of the same car polish from pretest 1 was displayed on the initial screen, to
provide realism to the context. The same nine contextual prices and three focal prices were
retained from pretest 1. After all the contextual prices were displayed, subjects were shown a
single focal price and asked to provide price judgments (i.e., 18 items provided in Table A.2.2)
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and purchase intent responses (i.e., three items). Once the focal price was evaluated, and the
responses were collected, the same process was repeated for two other focal prices, keeping the
range, mean, and distributions of the contextual prices the same for each type of price judgment.
Data for this pretest were collected online using Qualtrics. Each condition was generated as a
separate link to be randomly distributed to survey participants.
2.4.1.2.4 Results
The new price magnitude items were first tested for reliability. Appendix Table A.2.5
summarizes price magnitude items dropped in each iteration of pretest 2, the criteria used to
eliminate items at each stage, and the final best items retained for price magnitude scale. The
final four-item price magnitude scale confirmed high scale reliability (alpha = 0.980).
Factor analysis results show a clear three-factor solution to support unidmensionality of
the three price judgment constructs (Table 2.3). The rotated solutions show the largest item
loadings only on factors to which they are conceptually related. Table A.2.5 displays the factor
analysis results of this pretest.
Table 2.3 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix, pretest 2)
Price judgment
scale items
Fair
Reasonable
Satisfactory
Acceptable
Low
Small
Little
Tiny
Expected
Predictable
Common
Ordinary

Factors
1
2
3
(at low focal price)
0.124 0.113 0.755
0.219 0.000 0.802
0.002 -0.044 0.829
0.177 -0.033 0.789
0.802 -0.103 0.144
0.939 -0.168 0.104
0.927 -0.077 0.197
0.827 -0.143 0.129
-0.015 0.908 -0.011
-0.041 0.909 -0.022
-0.177 0.863 0.015
-0.298 0.833 0.067

Factors
1
2
3
(at mid focal price)
0.837 0.358 0.269
0.859 0.325 0.300
0.874 0.330 0.218
0.876 0.314 0.237
0.359 0.207 0.745
0.228 0.120 0.879
0.199 -0.004 0.885
0.098 0.085 0.874
0.301 0.816 0.092
0.296 0.865 0.152
0.228 0.874 0.070
0.280 0.869 0.076
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Factors
1
2
3
(at high focal price)
0.837 0.358 0.269
0.859 0.325 0.300
0.874 0.330 0.218
0.876 0.314 0.237
0.359 0.207 0.745
0.228 0.120 0.879
0.199 -0.004 0.885
0.098 0.085 0.874
0.301 0.816 0.092
0.296 0.865 0.152
0.228 0.874 0.070
0.280 0.869 0.076

Table 2.3 shows clear segregation of three price judgments at each price level. The scale
reliability and factor analysis results suggest that the final price judgment scales display
acceptable reliability and unidimensionality.
2.4.2

Main Study

2.4.2.1 Purpose
This study collected data to test the proposed hypotheses. The main objective of this
study was to determine the effects of focal price and three proposed factors–locus of control,
judgment environment, and judgment/intent order–on three price judgments, and purchase intent.
2.4.2.2 Sample
Four hundred undergraduate business students at Louisiana State University participated
in this study in exchange for extra credit. The experiment took approximately 30 minutes to
complete and was conducted in groups of approximately 25 students in a computerized
behavioral laboratory.
2.4.2.3 Design and Procedure
Subjects were asked to pay close attention to the information presented to them on the
computer screen. E-prime was used to develop and execute the experiment, which allowed
response times for each question to be recorded unobtrusively. To control possible external
distractions such as noise or other environmental interference, each respondent was provided a
small individual cubicle in the lab.
The experimental design consisted of three between-subjects factors: locus of control
(external vs. internal); judgment environment (memory- vs. stimulus-based context); and
judgment/intent order (judgment first vs. intent first). One within-subjects factor was also
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employed: focal price ($8.99, $20.99, and $32.99, representing low, mid, and high focal price
respectively). This created a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 mixed design.
Locus of control was manipulated by describing a reason for the seller charging each
particular focal price. In the external locus of control condition, subjects were told that there was
a change in the cost of raw materials. In the internal locus of control condition, subjects were
told that there was a change in the retailer’s business objectives and pricing policies.
To manipulate judgment environment, contextual prices were either individually
presented on nine subsequent screens (memory-based context), or simultaneously displayed on
the screen (stimulus-based context). In the memory-based context, subjects were instructed to
remember the prices, because contextual prices would not be available during their judgment and
purchase intent tasks. In the stimulus-based context, subjects could see all the contextual prices
on each screen while they answered judgment and purchase intent questions.
To manipulate judgment/intent order, price judgment questions were administered prior
to the purchase intent items in the judgment first condition. In the intent first condition, the
purchase intent questions were administered prior to the price judgment items.
Once all the contextual prices had been displayed, the focal prices were presented. The
three focal prices were chosen so the low focal price was lower than all contextual prices, the
mid focal price was at the mean of the contextual prices, and the high focal price was higher than
all contextual prices. To maintain a uniform price distribution, a consistent $12.00 difference was
kept between focal prices: $8.99 (low), $20.99 (mid), and $32.99 (high). Also, the low and high
focal prices were located at the same distance (with a difference of $6.00) from the minimum
and maximum of the contextual prices.
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After price context was established, one randomly chosen price from the three focal
prices was displayed at the center of the screen, highlighted boldly with black borders. As the
location of the focal price stayed fixed, price judgment, purchase intent, and anger questions
were asked sequentially. Once a focal price was evaluated for price fairness, price magnitude,
price expectation, and purchase intent, the same process was repeated for the two other focal
prices. The display order of every focal price and the contextual prices was kept constant for
individual subjects, but randomized across subjects.
2.5

DATA ANALYSIS
The main study was conducted to test hypotheses proposed in this chapter. In this section,

scale reliability and validity for the three price judgments are evaluated, then results related to
the structural model are shown with a focus on relevant hypotheses, and analyses based on
repeated measures ANOVA are discussed.
2.5.1

Scale Reliability and Validity Assessment
Measurement theory suggests that summated scales comprising interrelated items should

satisfy reliability and validity tests for drawing accurate, reliable, and valid conclusions
(Cronbach 1951). Reliability measures the degree to which a scale is consistent whenever used,
and validity measures the degree to which interrelated items truly capture the underlying
construct. Since replication and precision are major concerns for any scientific inquiry, focus on
reliability and validity has always been of prime importance in marketing (Hair et al 1998).
Given the subjectivity involved in marketing scales, scale reliability and validity are particularly
necessary.
Cronbach alpha tests internal consistency of scale reliability. It ranges from 0 to 1 with
higher scores signifying greater reliability (Hair et al 1998). Nunnaly (1978) suggests 0.7 as a
minimum acceptable limit for alpha values. As alpha is considered a less restrictive estimate of
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reliability, a more stringent, two-stage alternative test uses composite reliability and average
variance extracted (AVE) for confirming reliability (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Composite
reliability measures the proportion of true variance each indicator reflects across all other
indicators of a latent construct. AVE measures the common variance shared among indicators of
a latent construct (Hair et al. 1998).
Convergent and discriminant validity are frequently referred to as the most important
aspects of construct validity (Trochim 2000). AVE (Fornell and Larcker 1991) and Cronbach
alpha have been proposed in the literature as measures to verify convergent validity. Dillon and
Goldstein (1991) and Bagozzi (1991) suggest an alpha greater than 0.7 and AVE greater than 0.5
as adequate support for convergent validity. Confirmatory factor analysis, AVE method (Fornell
and Larcker 1991), and structural equation methods are accepted as tests to confirm discriminant
validity of underlying latent constructs.
Data analysis, provided in Table 2.4, shows that each price judgment scale conforms to
the reliability tests discussed above.
Table 2.4 Reliability of price judgment scales
Price fairness scale
Price magnitude scale
Price expectation scale

Scale
Alpha
0.958
0.980
0.935

Composite
reliability
0.958
0.980
0.935

AVE
0.853
0.926
0.783

Each Cronbach alpha is greater than 0.7, and item-to-total correlations and squared
multiple correlations for all scale items are satisfactory. Composite scale reliabilities for the price
judgments are more than 0.7, and AVEs for the price judgments are more than 0.5. Compositereliability and the Cronbach alphas turned out to be identical, suggesting tau-equivalence of the
scale items. Taken together, these results show that price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation satisfy scale reliability.
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To verify whether price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations are different
judgments, each price judgment scale is tested for discriminant validity. Table 2.5 illustrates
results from the confirmatory factor analysis (using a CFA analysis in AMOS). In addition,
Table 2.6 shows results from the (rotated) component matrix of factor analysis, suggesting the
unidimensionality and distinctness of the constructs.
Table 2.5 Confirmatory factor analysis results for price judgment scales
Price judgment

Squared standardized
loadings

Price fairness (PF)

1
2
3
4
0.915 0.929 0.931 0.920
1
2
3
4 0.926
0.965 0.969 0.965 0.952
1
2
3
4 0.783
0.902 0.877 0.885 0.877

Price magnitude (PM)
Price expectation (PE)

AVE of
correlations
summated φ2< AVE
scale
YES
0.853
YES
YES

Table 2.6 Factor loadings (component matrix, main study)
Scale

scale items

Price fairness

fair
reasonable
satisfactory
acceptable
low

Factors
1
2
3
(at low focal price)
0.024 0.038 0.697
0.035 0.080 0.759
0.232 -0.039 0.741
0.160 0.049 0.721
0.804 -0.083 0.103

small
little
tiny
expected

0.833
0.868
0.745
-0.043

predictable
common
ordinary

-0.076 0.810
-0.100 0.810
-0.178 0.794

Price
magnitude

Price
expectation

-0.102
-0.082
-0.137
0.840

Factors
1
2
3
(at mid focal price)
0.867 0.154 0.163
0.834 0.216 0.160
0.810 0.248 0.135
0.883 0.167 0.070
0.190 0.815 0.045

Factors
1
2
3
(at high focal price)
0.277
0.766 0.275
0.251
0.830 0.236
0.215
0.793 0.146
0.262
0.722 0.281
0.278 0.149
0.831

0.216
0.176
0.167
0.073

0.840
0.865
0.851
0.023

0.105
0.089
0.128
0.835

0.845 0.220
0.819 0.236
0.868 0.228
0.213 0.168

0.041 0.172
0.079 0.090
0.022 0.136

0.096
0.102
0.120

0.799 0.206
0.819 0.145
0.809 0.055

0.197
0.108
0.067
0.006

0.173
0.307
0.188

0.157
0.181
0.158
0.825
0.799
0.734
0.775

Table 2.5 shows that squared standardized loading for each item is high, AVEs are more
than 0.7, and square roots of AVEs are more than correlations among the judgments scales (φ2).
The factor analysis results from Table 2.6 show each item loading highly on appropriate
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underlying constructs. These findings provide evidence for the discriminant validity of price
fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation.
2.5.2

Structural Model Assessment and Hypothesis Testing

2.5.2.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the four endogenous constructs (see
Figure A.2.1), with 15 items to assess reliability, dimensionality, and discriminant validity of the
scales used in this model (Netemeyer, et al. 2003). Results from the confirmatory factor analysis
are summarized in Table 2.7. Model fit statistics show adequate model fit. The overall minimum
chi-square statistic (CMIN) is 294.021. CMIN, a discrepancy function measuring the difference
between model-predicted and actual covariance matrix (input matrix), is found to be an
acceptable 3.500 (with degrees of freedom=84). The normed fit index (NFI), the goodness of fit
(GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) are within suggested ranges, at 0.988, 0.960, and
0.949. The comparative fit index (CFI), robust to sampling characteristics, is 0.991, and the
root-mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), supportive of a more complex model, is
0.048. Other indices, such as Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Brown-Cudeck Criterion
(BCC), which penalize for greater model complexity or over-parameterization, are 366.021 and
367.089. Each of these statistics support adequate overall model fit for the measurement model
(Kline 2005; Netemeyer et al. 2003). In addition, results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate
that all the scale reliability values are more than the accepted minimum (0.7), and none of the
AVEs are found to be less than 0.50 (minimum limit for unidimensionality). The range for
standardized factor loadings is 0.91 to 0.93 for price fairness, 0.95 to 0.97 for price magnitude,
and 0.87 to 0.90 for price expectation. Each item-to-factor loading is significant (p<0.01). Taken
together, the composite reliability, factor loadings, AVE, and factor correlations provide strong
support for reliability, discriminant validity, and unidimensionality of the price judgment scales.
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Table 2.7 Confirmatory factor analysis results
Model:
4-factor model:

Chidf
square
294.021 84

CMIN/ NFI CFI AGFI RMSEA AIC
BCC
df
3.500 0.988 0.991 0.949 0.048
366.021 367.089

Correlations between factors

Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation

Price
Price
fairness magnitude
-0.884

Price
expectation

Purchase
intent

0.163
0.049

0.805
-0.780
0.073

Test of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicted that while correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation are different constructs.
Results (Table 2.6) from the factor analysis show clear segregation of three factors.
Relevant items have the highest loadings on the factors they represent (with low cross loadings).
Confirmatory analysis (Table 2.5) shows high squared standardized loadings for each item, the
unstandardized loadings are all significant (AMOS output in appendix table), AVE for each price
judgment is greater than 0.7, and square root of AVEs are greater than correlations between each
price judgments. These results suggest price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are
distinct. The correlations (Table 2.7) are high between price fairness and price magnitude
(-0.884), between price fairness and purchase intent (0.805), and between price magnitude and
purchase intent (0.805). Of the three price judgments, price expectation is found to be least
correlated with price magnitude (0.049) and price fairness (0.163). The (linear) correlation
coefficients for price expectation may demonstrate lower values due to inherent non-linearity of
the price expectation scale. Based on these findings hypothesis 1 is supported.
2.5.2.2. Model Selection
In an exploratory process of model building, SEM allows researchers to compare
alternative model specifications. Evaluating comparative fit statistics across different models can
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identify a model that best fits sample observations. Model specification can take two approaches:
a) start with a simple model and gradually add paths; b) start with a saturated model, where all
possible paths between constructs are specified, then free each path in subsequent iterations
depending on the changes in fit statistics. For this data analysis, the first approach was adopted.
To choose an alternative model, researchers favor a model specification that results in an
incremental change in chi square value of four or more for changes in each degree of freedom.
This technique in SEM allows an iterative model selection process, helping researchers explore
relationships between constructs when theoretical explanations are nonexistent or inadequate.
First, the model consisting of price fairness, price magnitude and price expectations
mediating the effect of focal prices on purchase intent is considered the base model. To address
non-linearity in price expectation (which violates the necessary linearity assumption in SEM),
the entire sample is divided in two groups, with one group consisting of price expectations from
low to mid focal price, and the other group comprising price expectations from mid to high focal
price. These groups are hereafter described as less-than-expected and more-than-expected
groups. Splitting the sample into two groups requires testing for group invariance, i.e., to test if
the same conceptual model is relevant for both groups. Before testing for group invariance,
Kenney (2009) suggests testing for configural model fits, which assumes that an appropriate
measurement model is diagnosed and holds for both groups. Once a model is found to be better
fitting, group invariance is tested to find changes in structural path coefficients.
Based on theories of price judgment (Thaler 1985), price fairness, price magnitude, and
price expectation are expected to be correlated, requiring the SEM model to be specified with
correlated errors of endogenous constructs (i.e., the disturbance terms). Exogenous variables in
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this model consist only of manipulated factors. Hence, to compute covariance (input) matrix,
price judgments or their structural errors need to be correlated in this model (Kline 1998).
The initial structural model (shown in appendix Figure A.2.1) specifies that the effect of
focal price on purchase intent is mediated by price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation. Next, all possible alternative specifications of paths originating from focal price
through the price judgments affecting purchase intent are tested. Based on this analysis the best
model is the initial model, with an added direct path from focal price to purchase intent (Table
2.8).

Table 2.8 Fit statistics of the initial and final model

Model1: Initial
Model 2: Final

Chisquare
524.77
528.17

df
197
258

CMIN NFI CFI RMSEA AIC
/df
2.66
0.98 0.99 0.03
738.77
2.05
0.98 0.99 0.03
768.17

BCC
743.88
774.59

2.5.2.3 Structural Model Results
After several rounds of iterations, exploring all possible paths and comparing changes in
fit statistics, a best fitting model is selected (shown in appendix Figure A.2.1). Fit statistics
relevant for this model, and standardized path coefficients (and t and p values) for each group,
are summarized in Table 2.9(a and b).

Table 2.9(a) Structural equation model results-fit statistics
Fit statistics for structural model (paths unconstrained between groups)
Chi-square df
CMIN/df NFI CFI
RMSEA AIC
BCC
946.872
252 1.804
0.967 0.985 0.024
1408.872 1434.327
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Table 2.9(b) Structural equation model results with standardized path coefficients
Less than expected –memory
(group 1)
Coefficients t-value p-value
Focal price Price fairness
-0.651 -13.901 (0.001)
Focal price Price magnitude
0.831
23.894 (0.001)
Focal price Price expectation
0.822
20.545 (0.001)
Locus of controlPrice fairness
0.047
2.46 (0.014)
Judgment/intent orderPrice expectation
-0.078
-4.769 (0.001)
Price fairness  Purchase intent
0.370
4.79 (0.001)
Price magnitude  Purchase intent
-0.086
-0.881 (0.378)
Price expectation  Purchase intent
-0.109
-1.284 (0.199)
Focal price  Purchase intent
-0.176
-1.638 (0.101)
More than expected –memory
(group 3)
Focal price Price fairness
-0.728 -17.891 (0.001)
Focal price Price magnitude
0.753
19.444 (0.001)
Focal price Price expectation
-0.765 -19.169 (0.001)
Locus of controlPrice fairness
0.035
2.46 (0.014)
Judgment/intent orderPrice expectation
-0.077
-4.769 (0.001)
Price fairness  Purchase intent
0.338
4.17 (0.001)
Price magnitude  Purchase intent
-0.213
-2.748 (0.006)
Price expectation  Purchase intent
-0.033
-0.445 (0.657)
Focal price  Purchase intent
-0.299
-4.822 (0.001)

Less than expected –Stimulus
(group 2)
Coefficients t-value p-value
-0.562
-9.454 (0.001)
0.867
25.946 (0.001)
0.848
26.036 (0.001)
0.061
2.46 (0.014)
-0.066
-4.769 (0.001)
0.418
5.384 (0.001)
-0.069
-0.596 (0.551)
-0.077
-0.767 (0.443)
0.017
0.131 (0.896)
More than expected –stimulus
(group 4)
-0.834 -25.109 (0.001)
0.822
22.951 (0.001)
-0.810 -21.741 (0.001)
0.029
2.46 (0.014)
-0.072
-4.769 (0.001)
0.457
6.103 (0.001)
-0.198
-2.917 (0.004)
-0.028
-0.433 (0.665)
-0.247
-3.612 (0.001)

This structural model is also tested for group invariance. The measurement invariance
and structural invariance tests show insignificant chi square difference between unconstrained
and constrained model (the chi-square difference = 32.805 with 21 degrees of freedom, p=0.058,
NFI difference=0.001and CFI difference=0.000), indicating that the conceptual model
considered here (appendix Figure A.2.1) does not differ in model fit between groups (the groups
being considered as less-than-expected and more-than-expected, with memory-and stimulusbased contexts).
Table 2.9(b) provides the standardized path coefficients. The paths in the model for all
groups were statistically significant with the following exceptions. First, the path between price
expectation and purchase intent was not statistically significant in any group. Second, the path
between price magnitude and purchase intent and between focal price and purchase intent were
insignificant for groups 1 and 2 (less-than-expected groups).
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Across all groups, the effect of price fairness on purchase intent is significantly positive,
and increases from memory- to stimulus-based context (groups 1, 3 to groups 2, 4). The effect of
price magnitude on purchase intent is negative, but only significant for the more-than-expected
groups (groups 3, 4). The effect of price expectation on purchase intent is not significant in any
of the groups. Compared to the effects of price magnitude and price expectation, price fairness
has a larger effect on purchase intent.
The effect of locus of control on price fairness is significantly positive, implying that a
change from internal to external locus of control generates more price fairness. Compared to the
more-than-expected groups (groups 3, 4), this impact is stronger in the less-than-expected groups
(groups 1, 2). The effect of judgment/intent order on price expectation is significantly negative;
compared to when purchase intent is measured prior to judgments, price expectation is lower
when price judgments are measured first. The direct effect of focal prices on purchase intent is
significant only for the more-than-expected groups (groups 3, 4).
Test of Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted that (a) price fairness and (b) price magnitude mediate the effect
of focal price on purchase intent; (c) price expectation does not mediate the effect of focal price
on purchase intent. This hypothesis is tested using mediation analysis in SEM. Using Barron and
Kenney (1986) method, complete mediation would be established if it could be shown that a
significant direct path from focal price to purchase intent becomes insignificant after adding
price judgments to the model, while paths from price judgments to purchase intent become
significant. Partial mediation can also be confirmed when the paths from focal price to purchase
intent remains significant with the introduction of significant mediators.
Structural model results (Table 2.9b) show that a direct path from focal price to purchase
intent is significant only for more-than-expected groups (for group 3 and 4, t= -4.822, and
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t= -3.612, with p=0.001 for both groups), but not for less-than-expected groups (for groups 1 and
2, t= -1.638, p=0.101 and t=0.131, p=0.896 respectively). These results indicate that the effect of
focal price on purchase intent is fully mediated by price fairness and price magnitude for lessthan-expected groups (groups 1 and 2). These results support hypothesis 3(a) and 3(b).
The path between price expectation and purchase intent was insignificant across all
groups (t=-1.284, -0.767, -0.445, -0.433 for groups 1 through 4, with p=0.199, 0.443, 0.657,
0.665, respectively). Thus price expectation does not mediate the effect of focal prices on
purchase intent. These findings support hypothesis 3(c).
Test of Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 predicted that price fairness has a stronger effect on purchase intent than
does price magnitude.
SEM results reported in Table 2.9 (b) show that of the three price judgments, price
fairness has the largest positive effect on purchase intent across all groups. The path coefficients
are significantly positive for price fairness (standardized path coefficients of price fairness on
purchase intent for each of the groups are =0.370, 0.418, 0.338, and 0.457, respectively, with
relevant t-values being=4.790, 5.384, 4.170, 6.103 and associated p<0.001 for each group). Price
magnitude has significant negative effect on purchase intent only for the more than expected
groups (groups 3 and 4) but has no significant effect on purchase intent for the less than expected
groups (groups 1 and 2). The t-values and associated p-values for coefficients of price magnitude
on purchase intent for groups 1 through 4 are: -0.086, -0.069, -0.213, and -0.198; p =0.378,
0.571, 0.006, and 0.004, respectively. Price expectation does not have any significant effect on
purchase intent across all the groups. These results demonstrate that of all the price judgments,
price fairness has the largest impact on purchase intent which support hypothesis 4.
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2.5.3

Repeated Measures ANOVA
A multiple repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with three between-subject factors

(each with two levels), focal price as the within-subject factor (three levels), and four dependant
measures (price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, and purchase intent), which
employed summated scales and were measured at each level of focal price. The results of this
analysis are provided in Table A.2.6.
Test of Hypothesis 2
This hypothesis predicted that (a) price fairness is a negatively sloped function of focal
price; (b) price magnitude is a positively sloped function of focal price; and (c) price
expectation displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with focal price.
For each price judgment, the mean and the standard deviation for the summated scale at
each focal price is shown in Table 2.10. These descriptive results show that price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectation reflect expected patterns. For example, with an increase in
focal price, average price fairness declines and price magnitude increases. Price expectation at
the mid focal price ($20.99) has the largest value compared to price expectations at the lowest
($8.99) and the highest ($32.99) focal prices. This nonlinearity confirms the predicted pattern for
price expectation. Table 2.10 and Figure 2.5 provide the mean price judgments for the three focal
prices.

Table 2.10 Mean values of price judgments
low ($8.99)
mid ($20.99)
Price fairness
7.931 (0.057) 6.126 (0.084)
Price magnitude
1.736 (0.050)
4.897 (0.061)
Price expectation
2.268 (0.076)
6.589 (0.073)
Note: numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors.

65

high ($32.99)
2.630 (0.071)
7.798 (0.064)
3.132 (0.080)

The repeated measures ANOVA results (appendix Table A.2.6) indicate
significant main effects of focal prices on each of the three price judgments (FPF
=1648.157; FPM

(2,714)

=3162.264; FPE

(2,714)

(2,714)

=979.242, with corresponding p<0.001for each

judgment). Obtained t-values indicate significant mean differences between focal prices for each
price judgment (tPF,low-mid, 364 = 18.400; tPF,low-high,364 = 57.860; tPF,mid-high, 364 =36.873; tPM,low-mid,364 =
-45.503; tPM,low-high,364 = -70.120; tPM,mid-high ,364= -40.295; tPE,low-mid, 364 = -38.173; tPE,low-high,364 =

-5.021; tPE,mid-high,364 = 35.555 with corresponding p< 0.001 for each t-value provided).
SEM results also show (see Table 2.9 b) that path coefficients between focal prices and
price fairness are significantly negative (β=- 0.651, -0.562, -0.728, and -0.834, respectively, for
each group, with p=0.001 for each of these values), while these coefficients are significantly
positive for price magnitude (path from focal prices to price magnitude for each group is β =
0.831, 0.867, 0.753, and 0.822, respectively, with p=0.001 for each of these values).
SEM path coefficients between focal price and price expectation are positive in less-thanexpected groups (β=0.822 and 0.848, p<0.001), but negative in more-than-expected groups
(β=−0.765 and -0.810, p<0.000), suggesting a non linear relationship between focal price and
price expectation. The results from the SEM analysis and the repeated measures ANOVA
provide support for hypotheses 2(a), (b), and (c).

Price judgment

9
7
5
3
focal price

1
low

Price fairness

mid

Price magnitude

high

Price expectation

Figure 2.5 Relationships of price judgments to focal price
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Test of Hypothesis 5
This hypothesis predicted that response times are faster for price fairness than for (a)
price magnitude and (b) price expectation.
Table 2.11 and Figure 2.6 provide the mean response times for the price judgments of the
three focal prices. Average response times show that price fairness is the quickest of the three
judgments. The average response time for price fairness is significantly lower than price
magnitude (t364 = -4.129, t364 = -8.982, and t364 = -5.511,with p<0.001for low, mid, and high focal
prices) and for price expectation (t364= -5.447, t364= -8.770, and t364= -6.675, with p<0.001at low,
mid, and high focal prices). These results provide support for hypothesis 5(a).
Differences in mean response time between price magnitude and price expectation are not
significantly different at each focal price (t364=0.243, p = 0.808; t364= -0.714, p=0.476 and t364= 0.109, p=0.913 at low, mid, and high focal prices). These results provide support for hypothesis
5 (b).
Table 2.11 Average response time of price judgments (in milliseconds)
low ($8.99)
3568.007
4276.440
4233.107

Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation

mid ($20.99)
3586.456
4918.923
5043.2712

high ($32.99)
3656.355
4660.607
4679.097

response time

5000

4000

focal price
3000
low

Price fairness

mid

Price magnitude

high

Price expectation

Figure 2.6 Mean differences in response time of price judgments
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Test of Hypothesis 6
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments only price expectation is
affected by an interaction between focal price and judgment environment, and (b) price
expectation is lower in a stimulus-based context than in a memory-based context at low and high
focal prices, but does not differ across contexts at the mid focal price.
Multivariate tests shows significant interaction of focal price and judgment environment
(Wilks’ Lambda = 0.865, F(8,350) =6.827, p=0.000). The repeated measures ANOVA results
(appendix Table A.2.6) indicate a significant interaction effect between focal price and judgment
environment on price expectation (F(2,714) = 8.952, p=0.000), but also on price fairness (F(2,714) =
15.188, p=0.000), and on price magnitude (F(2,714) = 6.891, p=0.100). Hypothesis 6(a) was not
supported.
As shown in Table 2.12 and Figure 2.7, mean expectation measures are significantly
lower in the stimulus-based context than in the memory-based context at the low price level (t363
=3.597, p=0.000), and at the high price level (t363 = 2.785, p=0.006). Price expectations do not
differ at the mid focal price (t363 = -1.223, p=0.222). These results indicate that the focal prices
are more expected in the memory-based than in the stimulus-based context at the low and high
focal price levels. These results support hypothesis 6(b).
Table 2.12 Univariate contrasts – focal price and judgment environment on price
expectation
Judgment
environment
Memory-based
context
Stimulus-based
context
t-value (p-value)

Price expectation
Low
Mid
High

Price fairness
Low
Mid
High

Price magnitude
Low
Mid
High

2.932

6.501

3.349

7.962

5.879

2.881

1.865

4.983

7.665

2.393

6.680

2.906

7.899

6.382

2.370

1.602

4.805

7.935

3.597
(0.000)

-1.223
(0.222)

2.785
(0.006)

0.552
(0.581)

-3.048
(0.002)

3.669 2.659 1.465 -2.122
(0.000) (0.008) (0.144) (0.034)
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Figure 2.7 Mean differences in price expectation for judgment environment
Test of Hypothesis 7
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is
affected by locus of control, and (b) Price fairness is higher under external control than under
internal control.
Table 2.13 and Figure 2.8 provide the mean price judgments of the three focal prices for
the external and internal locus of control conditions. Multivariate tests show a (marginally)
significant main effect of locus of control (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.981, F(4,354) =1.728, p=0.143, one
sided p=0.071). Results of the between-subjects effects (appendix Table A.2.6) suggest that locus
of control has a significant main effect only on price fairness (FPF, (1,357)=4.454, p=0.036). Neither
price magnitude nor price expectation are found to be influenced by locus of control
(FPM,(1,357)=0.009, p=0.924; FPE,(1,357)=2.231, p=0.136), which supports hypothesis 7(a).
The univariate t-test results indicate that price fairness is significantly higher under
external control than under internal control (mean difference = 0.193, t363,PF, external-internal =2.123,
p=0.034). This finding supports hypothesis 7(b).
Table 2.13 Univariate contrasts – locus of control on price fairness
Locus of control
Price expectation

External
Internal
t-value (p-value)

Price
fairness
5.655
5.462

Price
magnitude
4.811
4.810

Price
expectation
4.036
4.215

2.123
(0.034)

0.017
(0.987)

1.730
(0.085)
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Figure 2.8 Effect of locus of control on price judgments
Test of Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 8 predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is
affected by judgment/intent order, and (b) price expectation is lower under judgment-first than
under intent-first condition. Table 2.14 and Figure 2.9 provide the mean price judgments of the
three focal prices when judgments are measure before purchase intent and when purchase intent
is measure first.
Multivariate tests show a significant main effect of judgment/intent order (Wilks’
Lambda = 0.958 F(4,354) =3.874, p=0.004). Results of the between subjects effects (Appendix
A.2.6) suggest that judgment/intent order has a significant main effect only on price expectation
(FPE,

(1,357)

=11.300, p=0.001). Neither price fairness nor price magnitude are influenced by

judgment/intent order (FPF,(1,357)=0.188, p=0.665; FPM,(1,357)=0.060, p=0.807). These results
support hypothesis 8(a).
The univariate t-test indicates price expectation to be significantly higher under intent
first than under judgment first condition (mean difference = 0.348, t363 =3.397, p=0.001). These
results support hypothesis 8 (b).
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Table 2.14 Univariate contrasts – judgment/intent order on price expectation
Judgment/intent order
Price expectation

Price
fairness
5.545
5.578
-0.356
(0.722)

Intent first
Judgment first
t-value (p-value)

Price
magnitude
4.824
4.797
0.338
(0.735)

Price
expectation
4.314
3.965
3.397
(0.001)

Price judgment
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4

judgment/intent
order

3

preference first
Price fairness

judgment first

Price magnitude

Price expectation

Figure 2.9 Effect of judgment/intent order on price judgments
2.6

DISCUSSION
This section summarizes the results, briefly describes the implications of these findings,

and discusses the limitations of this study with suggestions for possible future research.
2.6.1

Findings
This chapter developed and tested a conceptual model of price fairness, price magnitude,

and price expectation. Hypotheses related to these price judgments were developed. Results were
analyzed using data generated from an experiment. Structural equation modeling and repeated
measures ANOVA were used to test the hypotheses. Table 2.15 summarizes the main findings.
This study provided empirical evidence that the three price judgments are correlated, but
distinct constructs, supporting the seminal hypothesis. In testing the conceptual model, price
judgments were found to mediate the effect of price on purchase intent. More specifically, price
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fairness mediated the effect in all conditions, price magnitude mediated the effect in half of the
tested conditions, and price expectation did not mediate the effect in any condition.
In addition, primacy, or the importance of price fairness over price magnitude and price
expectation was supported. Finding support for the hypothesis that affective price judgments
have stronger effects on purchase intent than cognitive price assessment not only validates affect
primacy theories, but also helps to distinguish price judgments across the dimensions of affect
and cognition. This research replicates and extends earlier findings that affect-driven judgments
are processed faster than more cognitive judgments in the domain of price judgments. In
particular, response times were significantly less for price fairness than for price magnitude or
price expectation.
Finally, the effects of judgment environment, locus of control, and judgment/intent order
on price judgments were investigated. Judgment environment was found to affect price
expectation (but also affected price fairness and price magnitude), with lower means for
stimulus-based contexts than for memory-based contexts. This difference is found only at the
low and high focal prices, but not at the mid focal price. Locus of control affected only price
fairness, where these judgments were higher under external control and under internal control.
Judgment/intent order affected only price expectation, where compared to the reverse order price
expectation was lower when judgments were measured prior to purchase intent. Taken together,
these unique antecedents provide addition nomological evidence that these three price judgments
are distinct constructs. A summary of the hypothesis tests are provided in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15 Empirical support to proposed hypotheses
Hypotheses

Hypotheses
supported
H1: while correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price H1
expectation are different price judgments.
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Hypotheses
not supported

Table 2.15 Empirical support to proposed hypotheses (cond.)
H2: (a) price fairness is a negatively sloped function of focal price; (b) H2 (a), (b),
price magnitude is a positively sloped function of focal price; and (c) (c)
price expectation displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with focal
price.
H3: (a) price fairness and (b) price magnitude mediate the effect of focal H3 (a), (b),
price on purchase intent;. (c) price expectation does not mediate the (c)
effect of focal price on purchase intent.
H4: price fairness has a stronger effect on purchase intent than does price H4
magnitude.
H5: response times are faster for price fairness than for (a) price H5(a), (b)
magnitude and (b) price expectation.
H6: (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by H6 (b)
an interaction between focal price and judgment environment;(b) price
expectation is lower in a stimulus-based context than in a memory-based
context at low and high focal prices, but does not differ across contexts
at the mid focal price.
H7: (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by H7(a) and
locus of control; (b) price fairness is higher under external control than (b)
under internal control.
H8: (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by H8(a)
judgment/intent order; (b) price expectation is lower under judgment first (b)
than under intent first condition.

H6 (a)

and

This research extends price judgment and consumer decision making literature by finding
evidence that a) price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations are different types of
price judgments; b) price fairness and price magnitude mediate the effect of focal price with
varying degrees of impact on purchase intent; c) memory-and stimulus-based contexts bear
distinct implications only for price expectation, providing further justification for claiming that
context plays varying roles of importance on three important price judgments; and d) price
fairness and price magnitude are constructed automatically.
2.6.2

Implications
These findings add significant value to existing price judgment theories through the

following iimplications. First, understanding that these three price judgments are distinct is an
important contribution. Previous research isolated a single price judgment in an individual study.
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Such an approach either fails to conceptualize the differences that exist between price judgments,
or inherently implies that results applicable to one price judgment are probably true for other
price judgments. With a notable exception from Xia and Monroe (2005), pricing studies
generalize findings obtained from studying one specific price judgment as applicable to all other
price judgments. For example, factors that influence price fairness would also be considered to
affect price magnitude; price fairness could, in such a scenario, be considered an alternative
interpretation of price magnitude. In measurement terms, price expectation or price fairness
items would be incorporated into the same scale as price magnitude items. Finding that price
fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations are distinct and developing scales to measure
these price judgments provides important contributions to the price judgment literature.
Findings from this chapter may also help consumers make better purchase decisions by
making consumers more aware of the type of price judgments that influence their purchase
decisions. Marketing managers may benefit from this research by better understanding the
antecedents of these price judgments and which judgments affect consumer purchase decisions.
2.6.3

Future Research and Limitations
The research presented here is subjected to limitations that are inherent in projects of

similar nature. An obvious issue is the sample, whose size and relevance needs to be tested in the
real world, with different demographics. Supporting hypotheses with a small number of mostly
homogenous participants is a potential shortcoming. Still, it was encouraging to find that the
three main price judgments passed the discriminant validity and unidimensionality tests in
separate studies using different samples. This may indicate that fundamental differences do exist
between price judgments. It would be quite interesting, from the standpoint of external validity,
to see how price judgments differ in the real world with several attenuating factors.
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This research paves the way for several future studies. First, price judgments not
considered in this research could be included in the conceptual model developed here, which
could significantly expand this research by finding different moderating or mediating
relationships. Second, it would be worth finding different environmental variables and various
contexts that could differentiate or add further explanations to price judgments. Third, exploring
the breadth and depth involved in information processing stages associated with each type of
price judgment could reveal more interesting questions about price judgments. Finally, growing
awareness of consciousness and automaticity in judgment research can be applied in this
research to see how price judgments differ across different levels of conscious thinking.
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CHAPTER 3: FURTHER DISTINCTIONS AMONG PRICE FAIRNESS, PRICE
MAGNITUDE, AND PRICE EXPECTATION: THE ROLES OF MOOD AND
PROCESSING FLUENCY
3.1

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 replicates and extends Chapter 2. Replicating Chapter 2, this chapter pursues

the primary objective of distinguishing between price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation. Extending Chapter 2, this chapter investigates two new antecedents, mood and
processing fluency, and one additional dependent measure, consumer anger.
Research on how mood and processing fluency influence price judgment is limited.
Thomas and Morwitz’s (2009) findings, that computational ease positively affects price
magnitude, is often cited as the only empirical research in this area. Many questions remain
unanswered. Do mood and processing fluency have similar effects on price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectation? Any evidence that processing fluency influences each price
judgment differently would strengthen conceptual distinctions between the three price
judgments.
This chapter seeks to answer several research questions. How do mood and processing
fluency differentiate price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation? Does mood affect
price fairness, an affective judgment, differently from price magnitude or price expectation? Can
processing fluency influence price magnitude? How does memory interact with processing
fluency to affect price judgments? Does mood interact with processing fluency? To address these
questions, this chapter develops several hypotheses and presents an empirical study designed to
test them. This chapter concludes with a discussion of findings, implications, future research,
and limitations.
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The next section provides brief definitions of price fairness, price magnitude, price
expectation, and judgment environment, followed by definitions and conceptual descriptions of
two new independent variables, mood and processing fluency. Next, definitions of the dependant
variables used in this study, purchase intent and anger, are also provided.
3.2

DEFINITIONS OF CONSTRUCTS

3.2.1

Focal Price
Focal price is a target price on which consumer judgments of price fairness, price

magnitude, price expectation, purchase intent, and anger are based.
3.2.2

Price Fairness
Price fairness is a consumer judgment of how just, reasonable, acceptable, or satisfactory

a focal price is (Xia and Monroe 2005).
3.2.3

Price Magnitude
Price magnitude is a consumer judgment of the numerical size of a focal price (Thomas

and Morwitz 2007). Consumers judge how large, big, or huge a focal price is.
3.2.4

Price Expectation
Price expectation is a consumer judgment of how a focal price compares to an expected

price.
3.2.5

Judgment Environment
The context in which consumers make judgments is known as judgment environment. In

price judgment, any available price information provides a judgment environment that can be
classified as a memory-based or stimulus-based context (Biswas and Blair 1991). In a memorybased context, reference price information is retrieved from memory; in a stimulus-based
context, reference prices are available externally (Biswas and Blair 1991; Grewal et al. 1998).
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3.2.6

Mood
Mood is a subjective, internal, and emotional state that is stable, not extreme, and weakly

centered on any specific stimulus (Thayer 1989). Mood consists of two dimensions: valence,
which can be positive or negative, and arousal, which can be low or high (Russell 1980).
Thayer’s (1989) conceptualization of mood as a two dimensional construct consisting of energy
(low or high) and tension (calm or tense) is consistent with the valence-arousal
conceptualization. Mood belongs to the category of non cognitive factors (Schwarz 1997), which
also includes emotions and attitudes, but mood lacks emotion’s specific referent and attitude’s
evaluative valence to referent objects. Batson et al. (1992) describe mood as a structured set of
beliefs, arising from expectations about future experiences, while emotion reflects instantaneous
and complex reactions to specific events or outcomes. Mood is considered to be diffused and less
informative, arising out of non-specific referent (Blechman 1990; Wegener et al. 1993).
Mood provides contextual effects (Schwarz 1997). Its effects on memory, through mood
congruency and mood dependency processes, are important determinants of how people attend,
encode, and retrieve information (Bower 1981). In mood congruency, emotional content of
material is matched with the emotional content in memory, which facilitates retrieval (Schwarz
1997). Remembering negative aspects of an object when depressed is an example of mood
congruency. Mood dependency explains how matching mood at retrieval with the mood at
encoding facilitates memory (Lewis and Critchley 2003). Mood dependency involves a neutral
object, but mood congruency implies that the information content of an object interacts with
mood (Lewis and Critchley 2003).
Mood, feelings, and emotions are important aspects of consumer behavior (Derbaix and
Pham 1991; Havlena and Holbrook 1986). Recent developments in social psychology explain
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how mood plays a central role in judgment and decision making (Pham 1998). Existing research
shows two distinct process-mechanisms, mood-congruent priming and mood misattribution,
mediate the effects of mood on judgment (Ottati and Isbell 1996). By priming mood-congruent
concepts, mood assumes an indirect role that biases encoding (Bower1981), interpretation
(Bower 1981), or retrieval of contextual information (Teasdale and Fogarty 1979). In moodmisattribution, mood enters directly as an input in the judgment process. The direct role of mood
has gained significant attention in psychology theories (Schwarz 1997). Mood as a source of
information influences processing strategies and evaluative judgments where individuals in a
happy mood employ heuristic processing, but individuals in a sad mood employ systematic
processing (Clore et al. 1994; Schwarz and Clore 1996; Schwarz 1997). Irrespective of its
underlying mechanism, mood influences human judgments; positive moods elicit more positive
or favorable judgments than do negative moods (Ottati and Isbell 1996; Schwarz 1997;
Winkielman et al. 2003).
Fishbein and Middlestadt (1995) distinguished non-cognitive factors from cognitive ones,
and studied the effects of non-cognitive factors such as emotional reactions, affective responses,
and conditioned reactions on human judgment. Extant research highlights evidence of how
individuals’ affective states influence evaluations, such as satisfaction with purchases,
impressions of people, and evaluations of past life events (Schwarz and Clore 1996). Empirical
evidence also suggests that people respond to stimuli more favorably or positively when feeling a
positive, rather than a negative, mood (Schwartz 1997).
Mood effects on judgment are primarily explained by three theoretical perspectives
(Schwarz 1997): a) cognitive accessibility theory suggests that mood enhances the cognitive
accessibility of mood congruent information in memory. For example, an object’s positive
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aspects are most likely to be accessible under positive mood; b) affect as information, which
suggest that people may use mood as input for judging a target object, rather than retrieving
mood-consistent features of a target; and (c) theories explaining choice of processing strategies,
which explain how processing strategies are chosen under a specific mood.
3.2.7

Processing Fluency
Processing fluency is a feeling of ease or difficulty a person experiences while making a

decision or judgment (Novemsky et al. 2007). It is also defined as a meta cognitive
understanding of ease or difficulty one experiences during processing of new information
(Schwarz 2005). Fluency feelings arise from two important sources, the ease of creating and
retrieving thoughts, and the ease with which external information is processed (Novemsky et al.
2007).
Stimulus processing is influenced by mental events that are uncorrelated to the
information content of the stimulus (Winkielman et al. 2003). Extant research shows that
identical information content may result in varying mental representations, primarily because the
content may produce varying degrees of activation (Mandler 1980), speed (Jacoby 1983), effort
(Schwarz 1998), and affective state (Reber et al. 1998), of which the speed and effort is
considered as processing fluency (Schwarz 1998; Winkielman et al.2003).
Processing fluency has two important dimensions: a) subjectivity-objectivity of fluency,
which characterizes the degree of consciousness involved during stimulus processing
(Winkielman et al. 2003); b) perceptual-conceptual dimension of fluency, which describes the
degree to which a stimulus is processed. In its perceptual form, processing fluency works only on
the surface level of stimulus; in the conceptual phase, deeper-level fluency categorizes and
processes a stimulus into semantic knowledge structures (Winkielman et al. 2003). Recent
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studies on neuro-imaging also suggest that perceptual processing decreases neural responses, and
conceptual processing activates brain areas responsible for creating or explaining meaning from
the stimulus (Demb et al. 1995).
Processing fluency affects evaluative judgments (Novemsky et al.2007). The greater the
ease of processing a target, the more positive the evaluations are. Processing fluency affects
probability judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), assertiveness (Schwarz et al. 1991), risk
perception (Raghubir and Menon 1998), product evaluations (Menon and Raghubir 2003), and
preferences for brand logos (Janiszewski and Meyvis 2001). A high processing fluency,
compared to a low processing fluency, generates more favorable judgments (Winkielman et al.
2003).
3.2.8

Purchase Intent:
Purchase intent is defined as the degree to which a consumer is willing to buy a product

(Dodds et al. 1991). It represents consumer intentions or beliefs rather than actual choice.
3.2.9

Anger
Anger can be defined as a negative affect expressing displeasure, irritation, wrath, ire,

etc. Anger has been considered as a coping mechanism to deal with a present situation (Smith
and Ellsworth 1985). Social constructivist theory of emotion (Averill 1982), which considers
emotion as socially constructed, and classifies an emotion in terms of instigation, target, and aim,
specifies that anger is instigated by violation of personal expectations, and is aimed at a person
or an object (such as a price), with a desire to change the condition that created the instigation
(Averill 1982). Using attribution theory, anger has been studied as an emotional outcome of
consumers’ attributed reasons for a product failure (Richins 1983). Of the possible consumptionrelated emotion, anger is considered as an important outcome of the consumption experience
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(Richins 1997). Anger is also generated when consumers perceive any violation of existing
equity norms (Xia et al. 2004). In this research, anger is the emotional response from judging a
focal price.
3.3

HYPOTHESES

3.3.1

Hypothesis 1
Fundamentally distinct price judgments are expected to be affected differently by

judgment environment (memory- or stimulus-based context). Price expectation, which involves
predicting an expected price, would differ if the predicted value differs under memory- or
stimulus-based context.
Price expectation, as defined in this chapter, is determined by comparing a focal price to
an expected price. Price expectation entails two judgment processes: prediction and comparison.
In memory- and stimulus-based contexts, the comparison process implies that a focal price lower
than the expected price would be judged as less than expected and a focal price greater than
expected price would be judged as more than expected. However, the prediction process would
differ in memory- and stimulus-based contexts primarily because a) the task for predicting a
price is easier in a stimulus-based context (Helgeson and Beatty 1987); b) with an easier price
prediction task, consumers show greater confidence and accuracy in a stimulus-based than in a
memory-based context (Delvecchio et al. 2007); and c) in a memory-based context, with lower
confidence in accuracy of the predicted price, consumers will place lower weights, and depend
less, on contextually retrieved price (Delvecchio et al. 2007). Therefore, in a memory-based
context, a systematic bias towards a focal price shifts the expected price (referred anchor) closer
to the focal price, and thereby results in weaker contrasts (Delvecchio et al. 2007), than in a
stimulus-based context, where all contextual prices are available, and consumers are able to
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eliminate systematic biases. Hence, difference between a focal price and a predicted price will be
larger in stimulus-based than in memory-based context.
Other price judgments should be less vulnerable to systematic retrieval bias.

For

example, price fairness is influenced by affect, and thus, the judgment environment should not
influence price fairness. Price magnitude is a comparative judgment, and does not involve a
predictive process. Therefore, it should not be different across memory- and stimulus-based
contexts. This leads to the following hypothesis, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (a).
H1: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by an interaction
between focal price and judgment environment; (b) compared to the price expectations
in the memory-based condition (which are assimilated), price expectations in the
stimulus-based conditions (which are contrasted) are lower at low focal price, equivalent
at mid focal price, and higher at high focal price.
9

Price expectation

7

5

3
Focal price
1
low

mid

memory

high

stimulus

Figure 3.1 (a) Hypothesized effects of judgment environment on price expectation
3.3.2

Hypothesis 2
Positive mood leads to heuristic processing and negative mood creates systematic

processing (Clore et al. 1994, Schwarz 1997, Schwarz and Clore 1996). Such processing
strategies result from informative functions of affect, generating interactions between judgment
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environment and mood (Schwarz 1990). Feeling good often “informs” a person that the
environment is supportive or helpful; feeling bad suggests a problematic environment (Schwarz
1997). A more challenging environment motivates systematic processing and greater attention to
information; in contrast, a less challenging environment motivates heuristic processing and less
attention to information (Schwarz 1997).
As an affective judgment, price fairness is likely to be influenced by mood. From the
affect as an information perspective, consumers generate affect-consistent judgments irrespective
of the diagnosticity of a focal price (Pham 1998). Thus, consumers would generate more positive
evaluations of a focal price in a positive mood than in a negative mood.
Blaney (1986) shows that mood interacts with memory. He provides two explanations,
mood dependency and mood congruency, to explain how mood-dependant memory facilitates
contextual information processing. Using network activation theory, Bower (1981) suggests that
mood activates specific memory nodes that are connected through a larger set of pointers to other
areas in memory. Reflecting similar views, Tomkin (1980) states that affect, working as an
amplifier, influences responses by affecting retrieval processes from other memory areas, or
reinforce confidence in the information retrieved. Therefore, we expect to see an interaction
between mood and judgment environment.
Mood influences judgment by priming mood consistent thoughts that bias encoding,
interpretation, or retrieval of judgment-relevant information (Bower et al. 1981; Bower 1981;
Teasdale and Fogerty 1979). Mood produces an assimilation effect (Otatti and Isbell 1996), such
that with positive mood, judgments become positive, or converge to larger positive values. This
mood bias is assumed to be resource dependant. Mood misattribution is often corrected with
greater availability of mental resources (Otatti and Isbell 1996), with availability of more
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judgment-relevant information, and with prior knowledge or expertise (Srull 1983). Having
sufficient cognitive resources, as in stimulus-based context, allows consumers to correct for
mood biases (Petty and Wegener 1993; Srull 1983). Greater information availability (Otatti and
Isbell 1996) allows accurate encoding and retrieval, eliminating mood’s affective impact on
judgment. Mood consistent assimilation effect is eliminated when mood does not enter into
judgmental computation (Otatti and Isbell 1996), particularly when judgment relevant
information is abundantly available.
Mood is expected to interact with judgment environment to influence price fairness. In
the memory-based context, with fewer available resources, the mood misattribution effect will be
stronger, with positive mood increasing price fairness and negative mood reducing it. With more
available resources in a stimulus-based context, people will correct for mood biases in judgment,
and the differences between mood conditions will be attenuated. Across all conditions, lower
focal price is always perceived to be fairer than higher prices (Xia et al. 2004, Bolton et al.
2003), eliminating the need for mood dependant interpretations at lower prices. Thus, the effect
of mood will be stronger at higher focal price. This leads the following hypothesis also
represented in Figure 3.2 (a) and (b).
H2: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a three-way
interaction between focal price, judgment environment, and mood; (b) in a memorybased context, a positive mood generates higher price fairness than a negative mood, and
this difference increases with focal price. In a stimulus-based context, price fairness is
not affected by mood.
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Figure 3.2 (a) Hypothesized effects of memory-based context on price fairness

Figure 3.2 (b) Hypothesized effects of stimulus-based context on price fairness
3.3.3

Hypothesis 3
Processing fluency, or ease of retrieval, affects human judgment and decisions (Tverksy

and Kahneman 1973, Schwarz 1998). However, our understanding of this robust finding is
somewhat limited in pricing research (Thomas and Menon 2007). Accessibility of information
and processing difficulty influence numerical price judgments (Thomas and Mennon 2007,
Thomas and Morwitz 2009). Price magnitude depends on mental computation of numerical
distances between focal price and a reference price (Adaval and Monroe 2002). In encoding and
retrieval of reference prices, processing fluency is expected to influence perceptual calculations
of numerical distances between the focal price and the retrieved anchor (Thomas and Morwitz
2009). Thomas and Menon (2007) find that low processing fluency produced by increased
computational task difficulty affects price magnitude. Numerical differences are perceived to be
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larger under low processing fluency (Thomas and Menon 2007). Therefore high processing
fluency is expected to generate lower price magnitude when compared to low processing
fluency. Figure 3.3(a) shows the predicted effect of this hypothesis proposed below.
H3: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price magnitude is affected by processing
fluency; (b) price magnitude is lower under high processing fluency than low processing

Price Magnitude

fluency.

7

5

3

Processing
fluency

1
high

low

Figure 3.3 (a) Hypothesized effects of processing fluency on price magnitude
3.3.4

Hypothesis 4
A principle that highlights the informative role of affect on processing fluency is the

“aboutness principle” (Winkielman et al. 2003), commonly known as the “How do I feel about
it?” heuristic (Pham 1998). This principle states that feelings direct goals, attention, and
information processing. But much of this effect takes place subconsciously, and is eliminated
when brought to conscious thinking (Schwarz and Clore 1996; Winkielman et al. 2003). Using
this heuristic, consumers generate judgments that are evaluatively consistent with their previous
or pre-existing moods. Pham (1998) further finds that the efficacy of the “How do I feel about
it?” heuristic is specifically relevant when consumer judgments are not stimulus driven. The
“How do I feel about it?” heuristic generates more perceptually rich representations than
attribute- or stimulus-based strategies can generate (Strack 1993).
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Winkielman et al. (2003) find that underlying mechanism of fluency could be
“hedonically marked,” which generates more positive evaluations under high fluency than under
low fluency. In other words, more quickly processed stimulus can generate positive affect and
produce a positive evaluation. Processing fluency creates “metacognitive feedback” of the
processed information, through which a signal can become available to other processing
modules, including an affect-based system, either directly (automatically) or indirectly (through
conscious processing) (Winkielman et al. 2003). Conditions which facilitate processing fluency
result in positive judgment (Schwarz 1998). Instead of relying on thorough stimulus-based
processing, people often perform quicker evaluations based on how fluently they can create
mental representations of the target and inspect their feelings about the representations (Pham
1998).
As argued, mood influences affective judgments, by introducing biases during encoding
and retrieval (Bower 1981, Teasdale and Fogerty 1979). Existing literature suggests that mood
affects processing style (Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Clore 1996). Using feelings-as-information
explanations, Chartrand et al. (2006) argue that mood provides input for choice of processing
strategy. With price fairness being the only affective judgment, one expects to find an interaction
of processing fluency and mood on price fairness. In a low processing fluency, a positive mood
relies on surface level information and generates higher price fairness, as opposed to negative
mood which scans information thoroughly and generates low price fairness. A high processing
fluency may generate an overall high positive mood and thereby reducing the need to consider
information thoroughly. This leads to hypothesis 4 shown in Figure 3.4 (a) and (b).
H4: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a three-way
interaction between price, processing fluency, and mood; (b) under low processing

88

fluency, a negative mood generates lower price fairness than a positive mood, and this
difference increases with price; (c) under high processing fluency, price fairness is not
affected by mood.
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Figure 3.4 (a) Hypothesized effects of low processing fluency on price fairness
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Figure 3.4 (b) Hypothesized effects of high processing fluency on price fairness

3.4

METHODOLOGY
This section describes the data collection methods for this research. A pretest is described

and its results are discussed. A main study, based on pretest findings, is also delineated.
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3.4.1

Pretest

3.4.1.1 Purpose
The pretests described in Chapter 2 resulted in a non-linear price expectation scale (i.e.,
price expectation was not a linear function of the focal price). As anticipated, the mid focal price
was most expected, while price expectation fell as focal price became more extreme. Both price
magnitude and price fairness were linear functions of price. Since a structural equation model
requires linear variables, a linear price expectation scale would help to facilitate data analysis.
Therefore, the objective of this pretest was to develop a linear price expectation scale.
This pretest used eight items each for price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation. The scale levels (nine-point) and the semantic differential format of the scale were
kept identical with those used in Chapter 2, except for the new price expectation items. Instead of
words such as “very unexpected” to “very expected” or “very unanticipated” to “very
anticipated,” as used in the previous study, the new items were modified to indicate a focal price
as “much more than expected” and “much less than expected” or “much more than anticipated”
and “much less than anticipated.” Scale anchors of price fairness and price magnitude were
identical to those in Chapter 2. An example of a new price expectation item is provided in Table
3.1. A list of items used for price fairness, price magnitude, purchase intent, and anger are
provided in appendix (Table A.3.1).

Table 3.1 An example of a price expectation scale item
Price Expectation -1
How expected [thought-priming word] is the price of this card reader?

1

2

3

4

5

Much more than expected

6

7

8

9
Much less than expected

90

3.4.1.2 Sample
Sixty –two undergraduate business students participated in the pretest in exchange for a
chance to win a $20 gift card where the odds of winning were 1 in 20. The study was conducted
online, using Qualtrics. The pretest was conducted over a one week period. After adjusting for
respondents who used the scales incorrectly or provided incomplete answers, the final sample
consisted of 52 respondents.
3.4.1.3 Design and Procedure
In the study, bipolar antonyms served as anchors on respective price judgment scales. As
shown in Table A.3.1, price magnitude and price expectation scales were reverse-ordered, while
the price fairness scale was positively directed, to yield scales that were consistent in direction
That is, as price goes up, price magnitude goes up, price expectation is more than expected, and
price fairness goes down. This directional consistency was considered necessary to reduce
subjects’ interpretational difficulty. The pretest included eight items for the price expectation
scale. Due to the change in meaning of the scale anchors, only two of the four price expectation
items used in Chapter 2 were employed here. In addition, to replicate the tests of the
psychometric properties of the price fairness and price magnitude scales, eight items were
employed for each scale, which included the four items used in Chapter 2.
A fictitious car polish was displayed on the initial screen to provide a realistic context.
The product was chosen based on earlier pretest results where subjects had low product
knowledge and low price confidence on car polish. The design was a 2 (judgment environment:
stimulus-based context, memory-based context) by 2 (processing fluency: low, high) by 3 (focal
price: low, medium, high) mixed design where focal price was the only within-subjects factor.
Subjects were asked to judge the three focal prices given a set of contextual prices, which were
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not judged. Processing fluency was manipulated by the number of prices in the price judgment
context. In the low processing fluency condition, 17 prices were provided to subjects. In the high
processing fluency condition, 9 prices were provided to subjects. Judgment environment was
manipulated as described in Chapter 2. In the stimulus-based condition, all contextual prices
were provided on the computer screen with the focal prices to be judged. In the memory-based
condition, all contextual prices were provided on the computer screen one at a time; subjects
were subsequently asked to judge the focal prices. Contextual prices ranged from $15.00 to
$27.00, in increments of $1.50 for the high-processing fluency condition (nine reference prices),
and $0.75 for the low processing fluency condition (17 reference prices). The uniform price
distribution for both types of processing fluency had identical range and mean values.
3.4.1.4 Results
Identical procedures as in Chapter 2 were followed for scale refinement. Each scale was
subjected to several iterations of reliability tests. In each stage, the least effective item from each
scale was identified and eliminated from subsequent iterations. Various diagnostic criteria for
testing scale reliability were considered. Items resulting in largest gain in alpha (if deleted) and
other indicators, such as corrected item-total correlation (at least 0.7), squared multiple
correlations (0.5 or more), and inter-item correlations (at least 0.5) were used as criteria to
eliminate the weakest item from the scale (Hair et al. 1998). Items dropped at each stage for
price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations and the scale reliability results for the
final scale items retained, are provided in appendix Table A.3.3.
When subjected to a factor analysis, the rotated component matrix and number of
eigenvalues greater than 1 show three distinct orthogonal factors. Testing unidimensionality of
each price judgment scale requires related items to have highest loadings on the underlying
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common factor they represent, and low cross loadings on other factors (Hair et al. 1998). Results
based on factor analysis (Table 3.2) suggest that final scale items satisfy the unidimensionality
test. These price judgment items can be further used to represent price fairness, price magnitude,
and price expectation as three unique underlying factors.
Table 3.2 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix)
Final scale items retained
Price fairness 1(fair)

Low focal price
0.280 0.876 0.245

Mid focal price
0.899 0.109 0.160

High focal price
0.376 0.190 0.787

Price fairness 2 (reasonable)

0.321

0.851

0.228

0.882

0.104

0.390

0.222 -0.009 0.711

Price fairness 3 (satisfactory)

0.212

0.877

0.333

0.862

0.056

0.359

0.628

0.234

0.638

Price fairness 8 (acceptable)

0.224

0.872

0.340

0.898

0.034

0.322

0.497

0.233

0.754

Price magnitude 1 (low)

0.444

0.198

0.753

0.516

0.305

0.600

0.766 -0.066 0.372

Price magnitude 2 (small)

0.307

0.364

0.765

0.311

0.194

0.775

0.886

0.193

0.337

Price magnitude 4 (little)

0.329

0.383

0.790

0.306

0.128

0.853

0.868

0.232

0.311

Price magnitude 6 (tiny)

0.111

0.238

0.795

0.289

0.141

0.866

0.905

0.209

0.263

Price expectation 1 (expected)

0.897

0.308

0.239

0.120

0.852

0.106

0.129

0.956

0.042

Price expectation 2 (predicted)

0.839

0.296

0.381

0.118

0.915

0.154

0.000

0.938

0.254

Price expectation 3 (typical)

0.912

0.235

0.208 -0.059 0.934

0.091

0.106

0.937

0.208

Price expectation 6 (anticipated)

0.911

0.217

0.246

0.221

0.351

0.805 -0.081

3.4.2

0.145

0.916

Main Study

3.4.2.1 Purpose
This study was intended to test the proposed hypotheses. The main objective of this study
was to determine the effects of focal price and three proposed factors, judgment environment,
mood, and processing fluency on the three price judgments, anger, and purchase intent.
3.4.2.2 Sample
Two hundred and forty three undergraduate business students participated in the
experiment in exchange for extra credit.
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3.4.2.3 Design and Procedure
The experiment took approximately 60 minutes to complete and was conducted in groups
of approximately 25 students in a computerized behavioral laboratory. Each study session was
conducted at approximately the same time of the day, over two weeks. This experiment was run
on Windows-based networked computers. E-prime 2.0 was used to develop, execute, and collect
responses. Respondents were instructed to observe the experimental condition on a computer
screen and respond to questions by using the attached keyboard. Response times for each
question were recorded unobtrusively. To control for external distractions, noise, or other
environmental interference, each respondent was provided with an individual cubicle in the lab.
The experimental design consisted of three between-subjects factors and one withinsubjects factor. The between-subjects factors were mood (positive vs. negative), processing
fluency (high vs. low), and judgment environment (memory- vs. stimulus-based context). The
within-subjects factor was focal price ($8.99, $20.99, and $32.99, representing low, mid, and
high focal prices). This created a 2x2x2x3 mixed design.
A five-minute movie clip was used to manipulate mood. To create a positive mood, a
scene from the movie “Jungle Book,” depicting the song “Bare Necessities,” was played. For the
negative mood condition, a scene from the movie “Sophie’s Choice,” depicting a concentration
camp scenario, was chosen. The video was projected on a screen at the front of the experimental
lab. A mood condition was randomly assigned to each session.
To manipulate processing fluency, respondents were presented with either nine (high
processing fluency) or 17 (low processing fluency) contextual prices. Other studies have also
manipulated processing fluency by varying the number of provided reasons (Novemsky et al.
2007) or number of digits (Thomas et al. 2007; Thomas and Morwitz 2009).
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The contextual prices ranged between $15.00 and $27.00, in increments of either $1.50
(high processing fluency) or $0.75 (low processing fluency). Contextual prices were distributed
uniformly, with the range (between $15.00 and $27.00) and the mean ($21.00) kept constant for
each subject.
Judgment environment was manipulated as described in Chapter 2. Contextual prices,
randomly chosen, were individually presented on the screen for nine (or seventeen) subsequent
screens, in the memory-based context, or were simultaneously displayed on screen, in the
stimulus-based context. In the memory-based context, subjects were instructed to remember the
prices displayed, since contextual prices were not available during their judgment and choice
tasks. In the stimulus-based context, subjects simultaneously viewed all contextual prices on
each screen while evaluating each price judgment and anger questions.
The three focal prices were chosen so that the low focal price was below the contextual
range, the mid focal price was at the mean of the contextual range, and the high focal price was
above the contextual range. To maintain a uniform price distribution, each of the three focal
prices, $8.99, $20.99, and $32.99, representing low, mid, and high focal prices, consistently
differed by $12.00. Also, the low and the high focal prices were equidistant from the minimum
and the maximum of the contextual range by a difference of $6.00.
One randomly chosen price from three focal prices was displayed at the center of the
screen, highlighted boldly with black borders. Keeping the focal price fixed at the same location
on the screen, price judgments, purchase intent, and anger questions were presented sequentially.
Once a focal price was evaluated for price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, purchase
intent, and anger, the same process was repeated for two other focal prices. The display order of
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each focal price and the contextual prices were kept constant for individual subject, but
randomized across subjects.
3.5

DATA ANALYSIS
The main study was conducted to test hypotheses proposed in this chapter. First, scale

reliability and validity assessments for three price judgments are evaluated. Second, results
related to structural model are provided to explore the relationships between the price judgments,
purchase intent, and anger. The proposed hypotheses are tested using repeated measures
ANOVA.
3.5.1

Scale Reliability and Validity Assessment
According to measurement theory, drawing accurate, reliable, and valid conclusions

based on perceptual data requires testing unidimensionality, reliability and validity for a
summated scale (Cronbach 1951). Such testing ensures that the scale is accurate, and can be
replicated in further studies. Reliability measures the degree to which a scale is consistent
whenever used, while validity measures the degree to which interrelated items truly capture the
underlying construct (Hair et al. 1998).
Cronbach alpha measures scale reliability based on the internal consistency of items (Hair
et al. 1998). Alpha coefficients range from values 0 to 1 with higher scores signifying greater
reliability. Nunnaly (1978) recommends 0.7 as a minimum acceptable value for alpha. Anderson
and Gerbing (1988) recommend a more stringent test using composite reliability (CR) and
average variance extracted (AVE). CR measures the extent to which indicators capture a
proportion of their unique variance of constructs and AVE measures the common variance
shared by the indicators (Hair et al. 1998). AVE (Fornell and Larcker 1981) and Cronbach alpha
are commonly reported measures of convergent validity (Hair et al. 1998). Dillon and Goldstein
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(1984) and Bagozzi (1991) suggest that a coefficient alpha greater than 0.7 and an AVE greater
than 0.5 provide adequate support for convergent validity. In addition to establishing convergent
validity, confirming discriminant validity of the latent constructs is also suggested (Hair et al.
1998). Using confirmatory factor analysis the AVE method (Fornell and Larcker 1991) is used to
test discriminant validity. In addition to reliability and validity, Anderson and Garbing (1988)
have also suggested testing scale unidimensionality of the latent construct.
The data analysis begins by confirming the reliability and validity of the scales used in
this study. The reliability analysis of price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation,
provided in Table 3.3, conforms to all criteria discussed above. Each scale’s alpha value is more
than the accepted minimum of 0.7, and item to total correlations and squared multiple
correlations of each scale item are high. Composite scale reliabilities for each price judgment
scale are more than 0.7, and AVEs for each are higher than 0.5. These results show that the
multi-item scales used in this study to measure price fairness, price magnitude, and price
expectation satisfy scale reliability tests.
Table 3.3 Reliability of price judgment scales
Scale
Alpha
Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Anger

0.961
0.984
0.957
0.980
0.961

Composite
reliability
of scale
0.961
0.984
0.957
0.980
0.961

AVE

0.860
0.938
0.846
0.943
0.893

Each price judgment scale was tested for discriminant validity. Factor analysis results
(Table A.3.3 in appendix) illustrate unidimensionality of each scale at each focal price. Relevant
scale items reflecting price judgment, purchase intent, and anger have the largest factor loadings
on respective factors only. None of the cross loadings are high (cross loadings values are not
more than 0.230).
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Table 3.4 Correlations between dependent variables
Price judgment

Price
fairness

Price fairness

Price
Price
Purchase
magnitude expectation intent
-0.906
-0.873
0.877

Price magnitude

0.923

Price expectation

Anger
-0.762

-0.855

0.834

-0.829

0.796

Purchase intent

0.762

Confirmatory factor analysis results (Table 3.5) show that standardized loadings for all
items are high and significant. AVEs are all higher than 0.7. The square roots of AVEs are
greater than the correlations between the measures, which satisfies discriminant validity. Taken
together, these results verify the reliability and validity of these scales.
Table 3.5 Confirmatory factor analysis results
Price judgment

Price fairness

Squared standardized
loadings of items

1
0.846
Price magnitude
1
0.947
Price expectation
1
0.810
Purchase intent
1
0.939
Anger
1
0.843

2
0.826
2
0.951
2
0.841
2
0.941
2
0.927

3
4
0.903 0.865
3
4
0.937 0.916
3
4
0.893 0.880
3
0.951
3
0.908

AVE of
Composite Satisfies discriminant validity
summated reliability (AVE > squared correlation
scale
between constructs
0.860
0.961
YES
0.938

0.984

YES

0.856

0.960

YES

0.943

0.980

YES

0.893

0.961

YES

Descriptive statistics (Table 3.6) show price fairness decreases and price magnitude
increases with an increase in focal price. The linear price expectation scale has larger mean
values at the high focal price ($32.99) and gradually declines as focal price decreases. Recall that
the scale anchors were “much more than expected” (9) and “much less than expected” (1) such
that the mid-point of the scale (5) could be interpreted as the expected price. Purchase intent
declines and anger (anger, frustration, and irritation) increases as focal price rises.
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Table 3.6 Mean values of price judgments, purchase intent, and anger

Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Anger

Low focal price Mid focal price High focal price
($8.99)
($20.99)
($32.99)
8.078 (1.072)
5.363 (1.569)
2.263 (1.123)
1.884 (1.130)
1.986 (1.133)

5.110 (1.020)
4.902 (1.210)

8.098 (1.061)
7.575 (1.343)

7.805 (1.710)
1.615 (1.048)

4.912 (2.176)
3.564 (1.790)

1.796 (1.120)
6.529 (1.860)

Note: numbers in parenthesis denote standard deviations.

3.5.2

Structural Model Assessment

3.5.2.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the five-factor 18 item measurement
model to confirm unidimensionality and discriminant validity of the scales (Netemeyer et al.
2003). Model fit statistics from the analysis, summarized in Table 3.7, show adequate model fit.
The overall minimum chi-square statistic (CMIN) is 343.390 with 125 degrees for freedom. The
discrepancy function measuring the difference between the predicted model and actual
covariance matrix (input matrix) is 2.747. The normed fit index (NFI), goodness of fit (GFI), and
adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) are 0.984, 0.949, and 0.930 respectively. The comparative fit
index (CFI), robust to sampling characteristics, is 0.990, and the root-mean square error of
approximation, supportive of a more complex model, is 0.049; other indices such as Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and Brown-Cudeck criterion (BCC), which penalize greater model
complexity or over-parameterization, are 435.390 and 437.898. Individually, each of these
statistics satisfies accepted minimum criterion to confirm adequate overall model fit for the
measurement model (Kline 2005; Netemeyer et al. 2003). In addition, all the scale reliability
values (see Tables 3.3 and 3.5) are higher than the accepted minimum (0.7), and none of the
AVEs is less than 0.50.
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The range of standardized factor loadings are between 0.909 and 0.950 for price fairness,
0.957 and 0.975 for price magnitude, 0.896 and 0.936 for price expectation, 0.969 and 0.975 for
purchase intent, and 0.918 and 0.963 for anger. Each of these loadings is significant. The
smallest loading is 0.900. None of the modification indices are very large (the largest is 9.58).
Taken together, these results provide support for the reliability and validity of these scales, which
are used in subsequent analysis.
Table 3.7 Confirmatory factor analysis results
Model:
5-factor model:

Chidf CMIN NFI CFI
AGFI RMSEA AIC
BCC
square
/df
343.390 125 2.747 0.984 0.990 0.930 0.049 435.390 437.898

3.5.2.2.Model Selection
An alternative model is accepted over another when incremental model fits, measured by
incremental chi squares, change by 4 or more values for each degree change in freedom. Similar
to the approach adopted in Chapter 2, the base model consisted of price fairness, price
magnitude, and price expectations mediating the effect of focal prices on purchase intent. A new
construct, anger is introduced to this model. Several alternative model specifications are tested to
determine the best fitting model.
Based on theories of price judgment (Thaler 1985), price fairness, price magnitude, and
price expectation are expected to be correlated. To account for the correlation among the three
price judgments, their disturbance terms are correlated (Kline 1998).
In addition to the base model, all possible alternative specifications incorporating anger
in the model are also tested. Depending on incremental fit indices (results shown in appendix
Table A.3.5), the best model turns out to be the one that specifies paths from focal prices to
purchase intent and anger as final dependant measures, mediated by three price judgments. In
addition, anger was also found to mediate the paths between price judgments and purchase
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intent. Fit indices of the initial model and final models are provided in Table 3.8. The final model
is also depicted in appendix Figure A.3.1.
Table 3.8 Fit statistics of the initial and final model
Chi-square df
269.423
95

Model1: Initial
(without Anger in the model)
Model6: Final
391.811
PL, Anger in the model and
PFAnger, PMAnger,
PEAnger and AngerPL path
added
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CMIN/df NFI CFI
RMSEA AIC
BCC
2.836
0.987 0.991 0.051
383.423 386.195
2.819

0.983 0.989 0.050

531.811 535.834

3.5.2.3 Structural Model Results
To account for the potential interactions between focal price, mood, processing fluency,
and judgment environment, a multi-group SEM approach was employed. The three betweensubjects factors (processing fluency, judgment environment, and mood) created eight groups,
which were separately fit to the final model shown in Figure A.3.1.Table 3.9 provides the
standardized path coefficients along with their t-values and corresponding p-values for each
group.
Before proceeding with the multi-group SEM analysis, configural model testing and
group invariance testing is performed. Those tests verify whether the same model holds across
all groups (Byrne 2009). Configural model testing is done by analyzing model fits with no
constraints imposed on the model coefficients. To test for model invariance, three different
procedures, from least to most stringent, are followed: a) test the measurement model invariance
by constraining factor loadings to be equal across groups; b) test the structural model invariance
by constraining factor variances and covariances to be equal across groups; c) constrain error
variances to be equal across groups (Byrne 2009). Of these three approaches, only the first
approach is tested here. Both the measurement model and the structural model considered here
passed group invariance testing (appendix Tables A.3.9, A.3.10-a and b).
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Table 3.9 Structural equation model results with standardized path coefficients
Focal price Price fairness
Focal price Price magnitude
Focal price Price expectation
Price fairness  Anger
Price magnitude  Anger
Price expectation  Anger
Price fairness  Purchase intent
Price magnitude  Purchase intent
Price expectation  Purchase intent
Focal price  Purchase intent
Anger  Purchase intent

Focal price Price fairness
Focal price Price magnitude
Focal price Price expectation
Price fairness  Anger
Price magnitude  Anger
Price expectation  Anger
Price fairness  Purchase intent
Price magnitude  Purchase intent
Price expectation  Purchase intent
Focal price  Purchase intent
Anger  Purchase intent

Focal price Price fairness
Focal price Price magnitude
Focal price Price expectation
Price fairness  Anger
Price magnitude  Anger
Price expectation  Anger
Price fairness  Purchase intent
Price magnitude  Purchase intent
Price expectation  Purchase intent
Focal price  Purchase intent
Anger  Purchase intent

Focal price Price fairness
Focal price Price magnitude
Focal price Price expectation
Price fairness  Anger
Price magnitude  Anger
Price expectation  Anger
Price fairness  Purchase intent
Price magnitude  Purchase intent
Price expectation  Purchase intent
Focal price  Purchase intent
Anger  Purchase intent

Low fluency x
memory x positive
-0.877
0.956
0.853
-0.223
0.488
0.210
0.748
-0.257
-0.013
0.023
0.022
Low fluency x
stimulus x positive
-0.935
0.931
0.916
0.016
0.457
0.439
0.501
-0.437
-0.469
0.375
0.190
High fluency x
memory x positive
-0.884
0.921
0.893
0.322
1.276
-0.152
0.695
0.134
0.035
-0.239
-0.250
High fluency x
stimulus x positive
-0.953
0.945
0.921
-0.443
0.165
0.309
0.661
0.041
-0.165
-0.002
-0.178
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t-values
(p-values)
-16.056 (0.001)
14.555 (0.001)
29.065 (0.001)
-1.852 (0.064)
3.115 (0.002)
1.708 (0.088)
7.825 (0.001)
-1.512 (0.131)
-0.136 (0.892)
0.171 (0.864)
0.267 (0.789)
t-values
(p-values)
-17.449 (0.001)
19.012 (0.001)
17.325 (0.001)
2.413 (0.016)
1.819 (0.069)
0.072 (0.943)
1.713 (0.087)
-1.617 (0.106)
-1.983 (0.047)
1.38 (0.168)
1.376 (0.169)
t-values
(p-values)
-14.633 (0.001)
15.291 (0.001)
18.672 (0.001)
1.325 (0.185)
2.719 (0.007)
-0.491 (0.623)
4.469 (0.001)
0.435 (0.664)
0.189 (0.850)
-2.102 (0.036)
-3.08 (0.002)
t-values
(p-values)
-16.24 (0.001)
24.292 (0.001)
30.254 (0.001)
-0.63 (0.529)
2.354 (0.019)
0.040 (0.968)
5.155 (0.001)
0.368 (0.713)
-1.022 (0.307)
-0.362 (0.717)
-1.779 (0.075)

Low fluency x
memory x negative
-0.921
0.942
0.865
-0.474
0.584
-0.208
0.604
-0.081
-0.296
0.078
-0.007
Low fluency x
stimulus x negative
-0.910
0.929
0.908
-0.504
0.199
0.170
0.323
-0.433
0.046
0.094
-0.230
High fluency x
memory xnegative
-0.953
0.945
0.921
-0.443
0.165
0.309
0.661
0.041
-0.165
-0.002
-0.178
High fluency x
stimulus x negative
-0.903
0.881
0.905
-0.168
0.340
0.168
0.632
0.058
-0.433
0.143
0.001

t-values
(p-values)
-20.189 (0.001)
15.61 (0.001)
26.06 (0.001)
-2.790 (0.005)
3.359 (0.001)
-1.310 (0.190)
3.408 (0.001)
-0.409 (0.683)
-2.09 (0.037)
0.440 (0.660)
-0.060 (0.945)
t-values
(p-values)
-19.227 (0.001)
19.82 (0.001)
22.796 (0.001)
-3.422 (0.001)
1.127 (0.260)
1.081 (0.279)
1.706 (0.088)
-2.093 (0.036)
0.259 (0.795)
0.418 (0.676)
-1.819 (0.069)
t-values
(p-values)
-26.078 (0.001)
20.222 (0.001)
26.509 (0.001)
-2.162 (0.031)
0.728 (0.467)
1.580 (0.114)
3.53 (0.001)
0.228 (0.820)
-1.072 (0.284)
-0.011 (0.991)
-1.886 (0.059)
t-values
(p-values)
-15.873 (0.001)
16.189 (0.001)
14.793 (0.001)
-0.673 (0.501)
1.279 (0.201)
0.688 (0.491)
3.122 (0.002)
0.296 (0.767)
-2.165 (0.030)
0.681 (0.496)
0.011 (0.991)

Results provided in Table 3.9 show that the effect of focal price on price fairness is
negative and significant across all groups. Effect of price fairness on purchase intent is positive
and significant across all groups except in low fluency, stimulus-based, positive mood and low
fluency, stimulus-based, negative mood groups, where the path coefficients are positive but
marginally significant. Path coefficients of price fairness on anger is negative and significant
across all groups except, positive and negative mood in high fluency-high processing stimulus
group and positive mood, memory group in high fluency where the path coefficients are
insignificant. The coefficients are positively significant in positive mood, low fluency stimulus
based condition.
Effects of focal prices on price magnitude are positive and significant across all groups.
Path coefficients of price magnitude on purchase intent is insignificant across all groups except
low fluency, stimulus based positive and negative mood groups where they are negative and
significant. Path coefficients of price magnitude on anger are positive across all groups but are
significant for all positive mood groups in memory and stimulus based contexts under low and
high frequency processing.
Effects of focal prices on price expectation are positive and significant across all groups.
Path coefficients of price expectation on purchase intent is negative and significant only in low
fluency memory based negative mood, low fluency stimulus based positive mood, and in high
fluency stimulus based negative mood. Path coefficients of price expectation on anger are
insignificant across all groups.
3.5.3

Repeated Measures ANOVA
A multiple repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with three between-subject factors

(each with two levels), focal price as the within-subject factor (three levels), and five dependent

103

measures (price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, anger, and purchase intent), which
employed summated scales and were measured at each level of the focal price. The results of the
analysis are provided in Table A.3.6 and used to test the hypotheses.
Test of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is
affected by an interaction between focal price and judgment environment; (b) price expectation
is lower in a stimulus-based context than in a memory-based context at low and high focal
prices, but does not differ across contexts at the mid focal price.
The multivariate test indicates a significant interaction between focal price and judgment
environment (Wilks’ Lambda=0.814, F(10, 222)=5.077, p=0.000). The repeated measures ANOVA
results (appendix Table A.3.4) indicate a significant interaction between focal price and
judgment environment on price expectation (F(2,

462)

= 6.887, p=0.002) and on price fairness

(F(2,462) = 3.001, p=0.051), but not on price magnitude (F(2,462) = 1.827, p=0.165). Hence
hypothesis 1(a) was not supported.
Using planned contrasts, price expectations are compared between the memory- and
stimulus-based contexts at each focal price level. As shown in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.1(b),
mean expectation measures were marginally lower in the stimulus-based context than in the
memory-based context at the low price level (t237=1.483, p=0.139, one-tailed p=0.07), and
significantly higher in the stimulus-based context than in the memory-based context at the high
price level (t237 =-3.329, p=0.001). Price expectations did not differ at the mid focal price
(t237 =-0.683, p=0.495, one-tailed p = 0.247).These results indicate that the focal prices were
more expected in the memory-based than in the stimulus-based context at the low and high focal
price levels. These results support hypothesis 1(b).
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Table 3.10 Univariate contrasts – focal price and judgment environment on price expectation
Focal prices
Low
Mid
High
Judgment environment
Price expectation
Memory-based context
2.093
4.851
7.302
Stimulus-based context
1.877
4.953
7.856
t-value (p-value)
1.483
- 0.683 -3.329
(0.139) (0.495) (0.001)

Price expectation

9
7
5
3
Focal price

1
low

mid

memory

high

stimulus

Figure 3.1 (b) Mean differences in price expectation for judgment environment
Exploratory analysis reveals that although the interaction between focal price and
judgment environment had no affect on price magnitude, the interaction did affect price fairness.
More specifically, price fairness was higher in the stimulus-based context than in the memorybased context at the mid focal price (PFmemory-mid price = 5.225 and PFstimulus-mid price = 5.888, t237=1.879, p=0.050), but not at the low or high focal prices (t237,
price=

low price=0.815,

p=0.416 and t237, high

0.084, p=0.933). These results further reinforce the idea that price fairness, price

magnitude, and price expectation are affected differently by the interaction between focal price
and judgment environment.
Test of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is
affected by a three-way interaction between focal price, judgment environment, and mood; (b) in
memory-based context, positive mood generates higher price fairness than a negative mood, and
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this difference increases with focal price. In a stimulus-based context, price fairness is not
affected by mood.
Multivariate results show significant three way interactions between mood, judgment
environment, and focal price (Wilks’ Lambda=0.914, F(10,222)=2.083, p=0.027). Repeated
measures ANOVA results indicate significant three way interactions between focal price, mood,
and judgment environment (F(2,462)=4.537, p=0.011). However, the three way interaction was
also found to be significant on price magnitude (F(2,462)=5.978, p=0.003) and price expectation
(F2df =3.525, p=0.035). Thus, hypothesis 2(a) was not supported.
As shown in Table 3.11, Figure 3.2 (c), and Figure 3.2 (d), mean price fairness in
memory-based context was significantly higher in positive mood than in negative mood at the
mid (t237 =2.257, p=0.026) and high focal price (t237=4.147, p=0.000), but not at low focal price
(t237 =-0.181, p=0.857). Mean difference in price fairness between positive and negative mood
also increases with increase in focal price (mean differences at low, mid, and high focal prices
are=-0.034, 0.690, 0.863, respectively). In stimulus-based context, price fairness did not differ
between positive and negative mood at any focal price (tlow, 237=-0.462, p=0.645; t mid, 237=-1.323,
p=0.188; thigh, 237 =-1.333, p=0.185). Results from Table 3.11 supports hypothesis 2(b).
Table 3.11 Univariate contrasts –focal price, mood, and judgment environment on price fairness
Focal prices
Low
Mid
High
Judgment environment Mood
Price fairness
Memory-based context positive
8.116
5.591
2.732
negative
8.150
4.903
1.869
t-value (p-value)
-0.181
2.257
4.147
(0.857) (0.026) (0.000)
Stimulus-based context positive
8.078
5.362
2.137
negative
8.071
5.768
2.388
t-value (p-value)
-0.462
-1.323
-1.333
(0.645) (0.188) (0.185)
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negative

Figure 3.2 (c) Mean differences in price fairness for memory-based context

Figure 3.2 (d) Mean differences in price fairness for stimulus-based context
Test of Hypothesis 3
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price magnitude is
affected by processing fluency; (b) price magnitude is lower under high processing fluency than
low processing fluency.
This hypothesis tests for significant main effect of processing fluency on price
magnitude. Multivariate results show no significant main effect of processing fluency (Wilks’
Lambda=0.990, F(5,227) =0.475, p=0.795). Thus, hypothesis 3(a) was not supported.
Although mean price magnitude is lower under high processing fluency than under low
processing fluency at each price level (Table 3.12 and Figure 3.3), but the differences were not
significant. Thus, hypothesis 3(b) was not supported.
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Table 3.12 Univariate contrasts – focal price and processing fluency on price magnitude
Focal prices
Low Mid
High
High processing fluency
1.817
5.084
8.085
Low processing fluency
1.950
5.135
8.170
t-value (p-value)
-0.908
-0.389
-1.061
(0.365)
(0.698)
(0.290)

price magnitude

9
7
5
3
focal price
1
low

mid

high proc

high

low proc.

Figure 3.3 (b) Mean differences in price magnitude for processing fluency
Exploratory analysis reveals a significant two-way interaction between focal price and
processing fluency on anger (F(2,462) = 4.188, p=0.017) and a significant three-way interaction
between focal price, mood, and processing fluency on price magnitude (F(2,462) = 3.135,
p=0.048). Price magnitude did not differ between positive and negative mood under high
processing fluency but differs significantly between positive and negative mood under low
processing fluency at high and low focal prices (Table 3.13). For reasons previously noted, this
finding indicates that at extreme prices, consumers’ affective reactions under low processing
fluency influence price magnitude.
Table 3.13 Univariate contrasts – mood and processing fluency on price magnitude
Focal prices
Processing fluency
Mood
Low
Mid
High
Price magnitude
High processing fluency Positive
1.722
5.111
8.046
Negative
1.896
5.061
8.007
t-value (p-value)
-0.952 0.258
0.191
(0.343) (0.797) (0.849)
Low processing fluency Positive
1.625
5.105
8.343
Negative
2.321
5.169
7.973
t-value (p-value)
-3.149 -0.348
1.992
(0.002) (0.729) (0.049)
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Test of Hypothesis 4
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is
affected by a three-way interaction between price, mood, and processing fluency; (b) under low
processing fluency, a negative mood generates lower price fairness than a positive mood, and
this difference increases with price; (c) under high processing fluency, price fairness is not
affected by mood.
Multivariate results indicate a significant three-way interaction between focal price,
mood, and judgment environment (Wilks’ Lambda=0.915, F(10,222)=2.054, p=0.029). Repeated
measures ANOVA results indicate a significant three-way interaction between focal price, mood,
and processing fluency on price fairness (F(2,462)=2.390, p=0.093, one tailed p=0.046) and price
magnitude (F(2,462) = 3.135, p=0.048), but not on price expectation (F2,462=0.125, p=0.866). Thus,
hypothesis 4(a) was not supported.
As shown in Table 3.14, Figure 3.4 (c), and Figure 3.4 (d), mean price fairness under low
processing fluency was higher in a positive mood than in a negative mood. However, price
fairness was significantly higher in positive mood than in negative mood at the high focal price
(thigh,237=3.656, p<0.001), but not at mid (tmid,237=0.831, p=0.408) or low (tlow,237=-0.632,
p=0.529) focal prices. The mean differences between positive and negative mood increases with
increase in focal price. Thus hypothesis 4(b) was supported.
Price fairness did not differ between positive and negative mood under high processing
fluency at any focal price (tlow,237= 0.018, p=0.985; tmid,237=-0.045, p=0.964; thigh,237 =-0.308,
p=0.759). Hypothesis 4(c) was supported.
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Table 3.14 Univariate contrasts -mood, processing fluency, and focal price on price fairness
Focal prices
Processing fluency
Mood
Low
Mid
High
Price fairness
High processing fluency Positive
8.181
5.374
2.282
Negative
8.128
5.339
2.280
t-value (p-value)
0.018
-0.045
-0.308
(0.985) (0.964) (0.759)
Low processing fluency Positive
8.045
5.587
2.749
Negative
8.033
5.326
1.934
t-value (p-value)
-0.632 0.831
3.656
(0.529) (0.408) (0.000)

Figure 3.4 (c) Mean differences in price fairness for high processing fluency

Figure 3.4 (d) Mean differences in price fairness for low processing fluency
3.6

DISCUSSION
This section summarizes the results, briefly describes the implications of these findings,

and discusses the limitations of this study with suggestions for possible future research.
3.6.1

Findings
The overarching proposition of this dissertation is that while correlated, the three price

judgments are distinct constructs that behave differently within a nomological network. To test
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this proposition and to advance our understanding of these price judgments, Chapter 3 developed
and tested hypotheses concerning the antecedents (judgment environment, processing fluency,
and mood) and consequences (purchase intent and anger) of price fairness, price magnitude, and
price expectation. In order to conduct empirical tests, a four-item linear scale for price
expectation was developed. A summary of the hypotheses tests are provided in Table 3.15.
Table 3.15 Empirical support to proposed hypotheses
Hypotheses

Hypotheses
supported
H1: (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by H1(b)
an interaction between focal price and judgment environment; (b)
compared to the price expectations in the memory-based condition
(which are assimilated), price expectations in the stimulus-based
conditions (which are contrasted) are lower at low focal price, equivalent
at mid focal price, and higher at high focal price.
H2: (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a H2 (b)
three-way interaction between focal price, judgment environment, and
mood; (b) in a memory-based context, a positive mood generates higher
price fairness than a negative mood, and this difference increases with
focal price. In a stimulus-based context, price fairness is not affected by
mood.
H3: (a) of the three price judgments, only price magnitude is affected by
processing fluency; (b) price magnitude is lower under high processing
fluency than low processing fluency.
H4: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a H3 (b) , (c)
three-way interaction between price, processing fluency, and mood; (b)
under low processing fluency, a negative mood generates lower price
fairness than a positive mood, and this difference increases with price;
(c) under high processing fluency, price fairness is not affected by mood.

Hypotheses
not supported
H1 (a)

H2(a)

H3(a) , (b)

H4 (a)

Even with a new, linear price expectation scale, hypothesis 1 validated findings of
Chapter 2, i.e., judgment environment affects price expectation. The finding that judgment
environment affects price expectation and price fairness but not price magnitude, indicates that
price judgments are different under identical judgment environment. This result accentuates an
overarching goal of this research, that price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are
fundamentally distinct. The effects of judgment environment on price expectation being stronger
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when judged prices belong to more extremes rather than mid level prices, exemplify an
important characteristic that price expectation is sensitive towards extreme prices.
Price fairness is influenced by mood and judgment environment interactions. Strong
influence of mood across all price judgments provides evidence that affect plays an important
role on price judgment (consistent with affect primacy results from Chapter 2).
Although hypothesis 3 is not directly supported, but when mood is considered in addition
to the processing fluency, it generates expected results, i.e. differences between positive and
negative mood become prominent in low processing fluency than in high processing fluency.
Hypothesis 4 shows that positive mood generates larger price fairness than negative mood, more
so under low than under high processing fluency. Exploratory findings from this hypothesis
show that, beside price fairness, mood and processing fluency interaction also influence price
magnitude but not price expectation—a reinforcement of the fact that price judgments are
different under the same antecedent.
3.6.2

Implications
With few exceptions (e.g., Xia and Monroe 2005), most research in the pricing literature

investigates a single price judgment in isolation. This approach may overlook differences that
exist between various price judgments or imply the effects hold for all price judgments. With a
notable exception from Xia and Monroe (2005), price judgment research overlooked the
subtleties of various price judgments. For example, factors that influence price fairness were also
considered to be affecting price magnitude. Price fairness was considered to be an alternative
interpretation of price magnitude. In measurement terms, items related to price expectations or
price fairness were added to price magnitude items in the same scale. Finding price fairness,
price magnitude, and price expectations to be different and finding items able to segregate price
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judgments, provides significant theoretical contributions to existing pricing research by adding
conceptual clarity to price judgments, and sets the stage to measure these judgments differently,
as well.
Findings from this chapter may benefit managers to understand how perceptual
differences in price judgments affect purchase intent. Providing a shopping experience that
influences consumers’ mood and processing fluency may generate different buying patterns.
Understanding how differences in price judgments affect purchase decisions differently may
influence different strategic and pricing decisions.
3.6.3

Future Research and Limitations
This research suffers from weaknesses inherent in projects of similar nature. Particularly,

in this study, an obvious concern was the sample size. Having approximately 250 samples
allocated to eight factorial combinations of experimental conditions satisfied basic requirement
of sample adequacy for an experiment. However, having a larger sample, and thereby reducing
sampling error, could either have added strength to the effects, or have found significance in a
factor that otherwise may have remained undetected due to small sample size. Also, realism
needs to be tested in the actual world with different demographics. The fact that proposed
hypotheses are supported based on student perceptions could be a shortcoming. However, it is
encouraging to find that the three main price judgments passed discriminant validity and
unidimensionality tests, which confirms that fundamental differences do exist between price
judgments. It would be quite interesting, from the standpoint of external validity and
generalizability, to see how price judgments differ in real market place, with several attenuating
factors. In addition, mood and processing fluency manipulations may be subjected to criticism
about their effectiveness.
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This research paves the way for several future prospects. First, finding alternative price
judgments that could be included in the conceptual model developed in this chapter can
significantly expand this research. Second, it would be worth finding different environmental
variables, as well as various contexts, which could differentiate or add further explanations to
price judgments. Third, exploring the breadth and depth involved in stages of information
processing associated with each type of price judgment can further reveal interesting facts about
price judgments. Fourth, it would be interesting to find if the order in which price judgments are
made has any impact on subsequent judgments. Finally, varying levels of consciousness and
automaticity involved in human judgments can as well be applied to the three price judgments
referred to in this research, which could significantly expand the domain of judgment and
decision making research.
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS
Table A.2.1 Prestest-1 with initial scale items considered for each type of price judgment.
Price fairness items:
 PF1 How fair is the price of this card reader?
 PF2 How reasonable is the price of this card reader?
 PF3 How satisfactory is the price of this card reader?
PF4 How agreeable is the price of this card reader?
PF5 How appropriate is the price of this card reader?
PF6 How tolerable is the price of this card reader?
PF7 How just is the price of this card reader?
PF8 How legitimate is the price of this card reader?
PF9 How warranted is the price of this card reader?
 PF10How acceptable is the price of this card reader?
Price magnitude items:
 PJ1 How attractive is the price of this card reader?
PJ2 How high is the price of this card reader?
 PJ3 How desirable is the price of this card reader?
 PJ4 How appealing is the price of this card reader?
PJ5 How expensive is the price of this card reader?
PJ6 How extreme is the price of this card reader?
 PJ7 How good is the price of this card reader?
PJ8 How significant is the price of this card reader?
PJ9 How large is the price of this card reader?
Price expectation items:
 PE1 How expected is the price of this card reader?
 PE2 How predictable is the price of this card reader?
PE3 How probable is the price of this card reader?
PE4 How likely is the price of this card reader?
PE5 How surprising is the price of this card reader?
PE6 How typical is the price of this card reader?
 PE7 How common is the price of this card reader?
PE8 How anticipated is the price of this card reader?
 PE9 How ordinary is the price of this card reader?
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1 2 3 4 5
Very
Unfair
unreasonable
unsatisfactory

6 7 8 9
Very
--fair
--reasonable
--satisfactory
disagreeable --agreeable
inappropriate --appropriate
intolerable
--tolerable
unjust
--just
illegitimate
--legitimate
unwarranted --warranted
unacceptable --acceptable
unattractive
high
undesirable
unappealing

expensive
extreme
bad
significant
large
unexpected
unpredictable
improbable
unlikely

surprising
atypical
uncommon

anticipated
extraordinary

-------------------

attractive
low
desirable
appealing

-------------------

expected
predictable

inexpensive
unextreme
good

insignificant
small

probable
likely
unsurprising
typical
common
anticipated
ordinary

Table A.2.2 Prestest-2 with scale items considered for each type of price judgment.
Price fairness items:
 PF1 How fair is the price of this card reader?
 PF2 How reasonable is the price of this card reader?
 PF3 How satisfactory is the price of this card reader?
 PF10How acceptable is the price of this card reader?
Price magnitude judgment items:
 PJ1 How low is the price of this card reader?
 PJ2 How small is the price of this card reader?
PJ3 How inexpensive is the price of this card reader?
 PJ4 How little is the price of this card reader?
PJ5 How insignificant is the price of this card reader?
 PJ6 How tiny is the price of this card reader?
PJ7 How inextreme is the price of this card reader?
PJ8 How low-level is the price of this card reader?
PJ9 How miniscule is the price of this card reader?
PJ9 How insubstantial is the price of this card reader?

1 2 3 4 5
Very
Unfair
unreasonable
unsatisfactory
unacceptable

6 7 8 9
Very
--fair
--reasonable
--satisfactory
--acceptable

high
large
expensive
big

---------------------

significant
huge
extreme
steep
enormous

substantial

low
small
inexpensive
little

insignificant
tiny

inextreme
low-level
minuscule
insubstantial

Price expectation items:
 PE1 How expected is the price of this card reader?
unexpected
--expected
 PE2 How predictable is the price of this card reader?
unpredictable --predictable
 PE7 How common is the price of this card reader?
uncommon
--common
 PE9 How ordinary is the price of this card reader?
extraordinary --ordinary
Note: Items marked with an arrow were retained as the best items to represent the construct.

Table A.2.3 Purchase intent scales used in pretest-1, 2 and the main study.
Please circle the appropriate number that provides your best response to each of the following questions.
Very
Neither low
Very
low
nor high
high
The likelihood that I would purchase the car polish
at the given price is
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 9
The probability that I would consider buying the
car polish at the given price is

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

My willingness to buy the car polish at the given
price is

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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Table A. 2.4 Scale refinement through iterative reliability analysis (pretest 1)
Iterations Scale

1
2
3

4
1

Price
fairness
Price
fairness
Price
fairness
Price
fairness
Price
magnitude

2

Price
magnitude

3

Price
magnitude

1

Price
expectation

2

Price
expectation

3

Price
expectation

4

Price
expectation

Items
dropped

Reasons/ Criteria for eliminating items

6th

gain in alpha if item deleted

4th, 5th

Low squared multiple correlations, low interitem correlations
8th, 9th
Lowest squared multiple correlations and
lowest item-total correlations, inter-item
correlations
7th
Lowest squared multiple correlations and
gain in alpha if item deleted
th
th
5 , 6 , gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared
8th
multiple correlations and lowest item-total
correlations, low inter-item correlations,
2nd
gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared
multiple correlations and lowest item-total
correlations, low inter-item correlations,
9th
gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared
multiple correlations and lowest item-total
correlations, low inter-item correlations,
3rd, 4th
lowest squared multiple correlations and
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item
correlations,
5th
lowest squared multiple correlations and
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item
correlations,
6th
lowest squared multiple correlations and
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item
correlations,
8th
lowest squared multiple correlations and
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item
correlations,

Scale
reliability
after deletion
0.94 to 0.95

Final
items
retained

0.95 to 0.94
0.94 to 0.94

0.94 to 0.95

1,2,3,10

0.87 to 0.91

0.91 to 0.91

0.91 to 0.92

1,3,4,7

0.89 to 0.89

0.89 to 0.89

0.89 to 0.89

0.89 to 0.89

1,2,7,9

Table A.2.5 Scale refinement for price magnitude (pretest 2)
Iterations Scale

Items
Criteria for eliminating items
dropped

1

Price magnitude

10th

gain in alpha if item deleted

Scale
Final scale
reliability after items
deletion
retained
0.9780.979

2

Price magnitude

5th

gain in alpha if item deleted

0.9790.983

3

Price magnitude

9

th

0.9830.981

4

Price magnitude

7th

5

Price magnitude

8th

6

Price magnitude

3rd

Lowest squared multiple correlations and
low inter-item correlations
gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest
squared multiple correlations and low
inter-item correlation
Conceptually unclear with the meaning of
the item
Conceptually unclear with the meaning of
the item
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0.9810.986

0.9860.984
0.9840.980

1,24,6

Table A.2.6 Results from repeated measures ANOVA
Factors
Main Effects

Measure

df

F

p

Effect size

Intercept

Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Price fairness
Price magnitude

1
1
1
1
2
2

14788.12
18050.83
6620.73
8309.68
1648.157
3162.264

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.976
0.978
0.949
0.959
0.822
0.899

Price expectation

2

979.242

0.000

0.733

Purchase intent
Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent

2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

882.571
0.007
0.532
6.956
1.130
4.454
0.009
2.231
0.567
0.188
0.060
11.300
1.402

0.000

0.712

0.932
0.466
0.009
0.288
0.036
0.924
0.136
0.452
0.665
0.807
0.001
0.237

0.000
0.001
0.019
0.003
0.012
0.000
0.006
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.031
0.004

Price fairness
Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Judgment environment Price fairness
x Judgment/intent order Price magnitude

1
1
1
1
1
1

Price expectation

1

30.808
40.178
30.131
0.482
0.106
0.215
10.935

0.052
0.042
0.078
0.488
0.744
0.643
0.165

0.011
0.012
0.009
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.005

Purchase intent
Locus of control
Price fairness
x Judgment/intent order Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Judgment environment Price fairness
x Locus of control
Price magnitude
x Judgment/intent order
Price expectation

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.086
0.340
20.128
0.148
0.051
0.832
20.333
0.006

0.769
0.560
0.145
0.700
0.822
0.362
0.128
0.940

0.000
0.001
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.006
0.000

1

10.080

0.299

0.003

Price

Judgment environment

Locus of control

Judgment/intent order

Interaction Effects
Judgment environment
x Locus of control

Purchase intent
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Table A.2.6 Results from repeated measures ANOVA
Price x
Price fairness
Judgment environment
Price magnitude

2

15.188

0.000

0.041

2

6.891

0.001

0.019

Price expectation

2

8.952

0.000

0.024

Purchase intent

2

9.483

0.000

0.026

2

0.085

0.918

0.000

Price magnitude

2

0.967

0.381

0.003

Price expectation

2

1.112

0.329

0.003

Purchase intent

2

1.371

0.254

0.004

2

1.898

0.151

0.005

2

0.206

0.814

0.001

Price expectation

2

1.741

0.176

0.005

Purchase intent

2

1.170

0.311

0.003

2

0.098

0.907

0.000

2

1.142

0.320

0.003

2

1.543

0.214

0.004

2

2.635

0.072

0.007

2

0.864

0.422

0.002

2

0.692

0.501

0.002

2

4.113

0.017

0.011

2

1.895

0.151

0.005

2

1.687

0.186

0.005

2

0.092

0.912

0.000

2

1.437

0.238

0.004

2

1.063

0.346

0.003

2

0.218

0.804

0.000

2

0.118

0.889

0.001

2

0.027

0.973

0.000

2

0.451

0.637

0.001

Price x Locus of control Price fairness

Price
Price fairness
x Judgment/intent order
Price magnitude

Price
Price fairness
x Locus of control
x Judgment environment Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Price
Price fairness
x judgment environment
x Judgment/intent order Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Price
Price fairness
x Locus of control
x Judgment/intent order Price magnitude
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Price
Price fairness
x Judgment environment
x Judgment/intent order Price magnitude
x Locus of control
Price expectation
Purchase intent
Error df. 357
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Table A.2.7 Reliability of price judgment items and overall scales

Price fairness items

Price fairness scale
Price magnitude items

Price magnitude scale
Price expectation items

Price expectation scale

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

Scale Gain in alpha
Alpha if item is
deleted
0.95
0.94
0.95
0.95
0.958
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.980
0.91
0.92
0.92
0.92
0.935
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Squared
multiple
correlation
0.80
0.82
0.81
0.81
0.91
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.76
0.72
0.73
0.72

Item to total Composite
correlations reliability
of scale
0.89
0.91
0.90
0.90
0.958
0.95
0.95
0.95
0.94
0.980
0.86
0.84
0.85
0.84
0.935

AVE

0.853

0.926

0.783

Table A.3.2 List of scale items used in this study

Price
fairness

Price
magnitude

Price
expectation

1
2
Very
unfair
unreasonable
unsatisfactory
disagreeable
inapproprite
intolerable
unjust
unacceptable
high
large
expensive
big
significant
huge
extreme
steep

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
fair
reasonable
satisfactory
agreeable
approprite
tolerable
just
acceptable
low
small
inexpensive
little
insignificant
tiny
inextreme
low-level

Much more than

Much less than

expected
predicted
typical
common
normal
anticipated
ordinary
standard

Purchase
intent
The likelihood that I would purchase the
car polish at the given price is

Very
low
1
2

3

expected
predicted
typical
common
normal
anticipated
ordinary
standard
Neither low
very
nor high
high
4 5 6 7 8 9

The probability that I would consider
buying the car polish at the given price is
My willingness to buy the digital card
reader at the given price is
Anger

Ziggy Electronics is now offering the
digital card reader at a price of
[focal price]
The price offered by Ziggy electronics
makes me feel

1
2 3
very
frustrated

The price offered by Ziggy electronics
makes me feel

very
angry

not at all
angry

The price offered by Ziggy electronics
makes me feel

very
irritated

not at all
irritated
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4

5

6 7

8 9
not at all
frustrated

Table A.3.3 Scale refinement through iterative reliability analysis
Iterations Scale

Items Reasons/ Criteria for eliminating items
dropped

1

Price
fairness

5th

2

Price
fairness

4th, 7th

3

Price
fairness
Price
magnitude

6th

2

Price
magnitude

7th

3

Price
magnitude

8th , 3rd

1

Price
7th, 8th
expectation

2

Price
4th
expectation
Price
5th
expectation

1

3

5th

Scale
reliability
after deletion
Gain in alpha, lowest squared multiple 0.9880.989
correlations, lowest item-total correlations,
lowest inter-item correlations
Lowest squared multiple correlations, lowest 0.9890.989
item-total correlations, lowest inter-item
correlations
Low squared multiple correlations, lowest 0.9890.987
item-total correlations
gain in alpha if item deleted, low squared 0.984 0.988
multiple correlations, lowest item-total
correlations, low inter-item correlations,
gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared 0.9880.989
multiple correlations, lowest item-total
correlations, lowest inter-item correlations,
lowest squared multiple correlations, lowest 0.9890.988
item-total correlations, low inter-item
correlations,
Improves scale alpha if items deleted, lowest 0.9800.990
squared multiple correlations and lowest itemtotal
correlations,
lowest
inter-item
correlations,
lowest squared multiple correlations and 0.9890.989
lowest item-total correlations,
lowest squared multiple correlations and 0.9890.989
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item
correlations,

Table A.3.4 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix)
Low focal price
($8.99)

scale
items

Price fairness

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2

Price magnitude

Price expectation

Purchase intent

1
0.089
0.055
0.204
0.171
0.698
0.796
0.840
0.892
0.234
0.227
0.217
0.187
0.171
0.176

Factors
2
3
4
5
(at low focal price)
0.053 0.158
0.077 0.697
0.152 0.177
0.200 0.634
0.286 0.057
0.124 0.740
0.077 0.088
0.075 0.733
0.083 0.290
0.280 0.249
0.178 0.256
0.192 0.116
0.182 0.267
0.149 0.079
0.137 0.167
0.088 0.092
0.015 0.771
0.028 0.218
0.180 0.757
0.133 0.210
0.144 0.755
0.244 0.160
0.185 0.653
0.184 0.008
0.155
0.130 0.202
0.878
0.111 0.151
0.900 0.122
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Final scale
items
retained

1,2,3,8

1,2,4,6

1,2,3,6

Table A.3.4 Rotated factor loadings (contd.)
Anger

Mid focal price
($21.99)
Price fairness

Price magnitude

Price expectation

Purchase intent

Anger

High focal price
($32.99)
Price fairness

Price magnitude

Price expectation

Purchase intent

Anger

3
1
2
3
scale
items

0.132
0.131
0.176
0.199

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
3
scale
items

0.062
0.038
0.087
0.210
0.807
0.826
0.825
0.822
0.161
0.159
0.153
-0.011
0.135
0.147
0.234
0.197
0.220
0.189

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
3

0.210
0.199
0.236
0.151
0.759
0.859
0.774
0.746
0.253
0.170
0.060
0.184
0.203
0.154
0.132
0.168
0.176
0.191

1

1

0.899
0.121
0.099
0.101

0.175
0.162
0.161
0.148

0.100
0.767
0.863
0.850

2
3
4
(at mid focal price)
0.790 0.109 0.145
0.841 0.103 0.044
0.750 0.321 0.170
0.792 0.246 0.083
0.143 0.141 0.188
0.031 0.156 0.203
0.115 0.100 0.014
0.087 0.120 0.274
0.215 0.074 -0.039
0.126 0.066 0.141
0.002 -0.030 0.077
-0.170 0.229 0.229
0.269 0.897 0.071
0.231 0.883 0.153
0.224 0.886 0.124
0.166 0.033 0.847
0.166 0.153 0.880
0.083 0.150 0.893
2
3
4
(at high focal price)
0.114
0.796 0.104
0.064
0.829 0.057
0.082
0.796 0.038
0.018
0.706 0.263
0.240 0.215
0.204
0.208 0.203
0.205
0.253 0.124
0.186
0.175 0.242
0.104
0.078 0.814
0.124
0.065 0.752
0.081
0.146 0.755
0.058
0.070 0.825
0.144
0.285 0.127
0.064
0.204 0.176
0.185
0.243 0.086
0.140
0.074 0.110
0.848
0.047 0.149
0.894
0.112 0.110
0.885
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0.169
0.179
0.162
0.102
5
0.103
0.194
-0.053
-0.072
0.120
0.146
0.157
0.086
0.786
0.817
0.794
0.600
0.076
0.153
0.078
0.152
0.075
0.135
5
0.194
0.111
0.222
0.295
0.170
0.122
0.106
0.179
0.089
0.120
0.021
0.165
0.815
0.868
0.875
0.151
0.144
0.052

Table: A.3.5 Fit statistics of models in the iterated stages
Model1: Initial
(without Anger in the model)
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger
path added
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger,
AngerPL path added
PL, Anger in the model and PMAnger
path added
PL, Anger in the model and
PMAnger, AngerPL path added
PL, Anger in the model and PEAnger
path added
PL, Anger in the model and PEAnger,
AngerPL path added
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger,
PMAnger, PEAnger path added
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger,
PMAnger, PEAnger and
AngerPL path added

Chisquare
269.423

df
95

CMIN NFI CFI RMSEA AIC
BCC
/df
2.836 0.987 0.991 0.051
383.423 386.195

494.841
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3.485

0.979 0.985 0.059

628.841 632.691

492.758

141

3.495

0.979 0.985 0.059

628.758 632.666

412.338

142

2.904

0.982 0.988 0.052

546.338 550.189

406.838

141

2.885

0.983 0.989 0.051

542.838 546.746

485.766

142

3.421

0.979 0.985 0.058

619.766 623.616

480.604

141

3.409

0.979 0.985 0.058

616.604 620.512

388.284
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2.773

0.983 0.989 0.050

526.284 530.250

384.063
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2.763

0.984 0.989 0.050

524.063 528.086
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Table A.3.6 Repeated measures ANOVA results for between and within subject effects
Source
Between subject effect:
Intercept

processing fluency

judgment environment

mood

processing fluency * judgment environment

processing fluency * mood

judgment environment * mood

Measure

df

F

p

Effect Size

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

10207.967

0.000

0.978

11346.918

0.000

0.980

PE

(1,231)

8330.320

0.000

0.973

PL

(1,231)

3695.483

0.000

0.941

Anger

(1,231)

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

2643.498
0.067

0.000
0.796

0.966
0.000

0.940

0.333

0.004

PE

(1,231)

0.078

0.781

0.000

PL

(1,231)

0.392

0.532

0.002

Anger

(1,231)

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

0.192
0.279

0.661
0.598

0.001
0.001

0.001

0.969

0.000

PE

(1,231)

1.787

0.183

0.008

PL

(1,231)

1.694

0.194

0.007

Anger

(1,231)

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

6.278
3.138

0.013
0.078

0.026
0.013

1.362

0.244

0.006

PE

(1,231)

0.611

0.435

0.003

PL

(1,231)

0.099

0.753

0.000

Anger

(1,231)

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

0.307
16.078

0.580
0.000

0.001
0.065

2.329

0.128

0.010

PE

(1,231)

0.032

0.859

0.000

PL

(1,231)

5.872

0.016

0.025

Anger

(1,231)

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

4.499
2.917

0.035
0.089

0.019
0.012

0.434

0.510

0.002

PE

(1,231)

0.193

0.661

0.001

PL

(1,231)

1.049

0.307

0.005

Anger

(1,231)

PF
PM

(1,231)
(1,231)

1.763
10.917

0.186
0.001

0.008
0.045

1.443

0.231

0.006

PE

(1,231)

0.778

0.379

0.003

PL

(1,231)

5.571

0.019

0.024

Anger

(1,231)

0.354

0.552

0.002
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Table A.3.6 Repeated measures ANOVA results for between and within subject effects
(contd.)
processing fluency * judgment environment * PF
mood
PM

(1,231)

2.461

0.118

0.011

(1,231)

3.414

0.066

0.015

PE

(1,231)

0.676

0.412

0.003

PL

(1,231)

0.211

0.646

0.001

Anger

(1,231)

2.257

0.134

0.010

PF
PM
PE
PL
ang
PF
PM
PE
PL
ang
PF
PM
PE
PL
ang
PF
PM
PE
PL
ang
PF
PM
PE
PL
ang
PF
PM
PE
PL
ang

(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)

1424.817
2432.326
1521.271
984.638
802.689
0.639
0.456
0.275
0.196
4.188
3.001
1.827
6.887
5.071
5.722
1.275
6.088
1.975
3.507
8.721
0.673
1.372
0.403
2.546
0.143
2.390
3.135
0.125
1.652
1.599

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.528
0.620
0.741
0.822
0.017
0.051
0.165
0.002
0.007
0.004
0.281
0.003
0.144
0.031
0.000
0.510
0.254
0.651
0.079
0.861
0.093
0.048
0.866
0.193
0.204

0.860
0.913
0.868
0.810
0.777
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.018
0.013
0.008
0.029
0.021
0.024
0.005
0.026
0.008
0.015
0.036
0.003
0.006
0.002
0.011
0.001
0.010
0.013
0.001
0.007
0.007

Within subject effect
price

price * processing fluency

price * judgment environment

price * mood

price * processing fluency* judgment
environment

price * processing fluency * mood
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Table A.3.6 Repeated measures ANOVA results for between and within subject effects
(contd.)
price * judgment environment * mood

price * processing fluency * judgment
environment * mood

PF
PM
PE
PL
anger
PF
PM
PE
PL
anger

(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)
(2,462)

4.537
5.978
3.525
4.575
2.835
0.725
4.348
1.540
1.278
2.452

0.011
0.003
0.034
0.011
0.061
0.485
0.016
0.217
0.280
0.089

0.019
0.025
0.015
0.019
0.012
0.003
0.018
0.007
0.006
0.011

Table A.3.7 (a) Univariate contrasts –focal price, mood, judgment environment on price magnitude
Focal prices
Low
Mid
High
Judgment environment Mood
Price magnitude Memory-based context positive
8.317
4.942
1.986
negative
8.045
4.850
1.742
t-value (p-value)
1.685
0.454
1.285
(0.095) (0.650) (0.201)
Stimulus-based context positive
8.342
4.847
1.617
negative
7.750
4.933
2.317
t-value (p-value)
2.482
-0.510
-3.644
(0.015) (0.611) (0.000)
Table A.3.7 (b) Univariate contrasts –focal price, mood, judgment environment on price expectation
Focal prices
Low
Mid
High
Judgment environment Mood
Price expectation Memory-based context positive
7.901
5.098
2.758
negative
7.911
5.192
2.646
t-value (p-value)
-0.050
-0.396
0.447
(0.960) (0.693) (0.656)
Stimulus-based context positive
8.238
5.022
1.824
negative
8.017
5.089
2.504
t-value (p-value)
0.932
-0.441
-3.152
(0.353) (0.660) (0.002)
Table A.3.8 Univariate contrasts – processing fluency on price magnitude
Focal prices
Low
Mid
High
Processing fluency
Price magnitude
High processing fluency
1.817
5.084
8.025
Low processing fluency
1.950
5.135
8.171
t-value (p-value) -0.908
-0.389
-1.061
(0.365) (0.698)
(0.290)
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Table: A.3.9 Fit statistics of SEM models- invariance testing
Chi-square df
Model: unconstrained
Model: measurement invariance-all
factor loading constrained
Model: structural invariance- factor
covariance constrained

2280.371
2389.325

CMIN NFI CFI RMSEA AIC
BCC
/df
1112 2.051 0.915 0.954 0.038 3400.371 3751.48
1203 1.986 0.910 0.953 0.037 3327.325 3621.38

2429.353

1224 1.985

0.909 0.952 0.037

3325.353 3606.24

Table: A. 3.10 (a) Group invariance testing results (compared to unconstrained model)
Model
Factor loadings constrainedMeasurement invariance
Factor covariance constrainedStructural invariance
Measurement and structural invariance

DF

CMIN

P

NFI

CFI

91

108.954

0.097

0.004

0.001

7

0.000

1.000

0.000

0.000

98

108.954

0.211

0.004

0.001

Table: A.3.10 (b) Model fits of constrained and unconstrained model
Model
Unconstrained
Factor loadings constrainedMeasurement invariance
Factor covariance constrainedStructural invariance
Measurement and structural invariance

CMIN

DF

P

2280.371

1112

0.000

CMIN/
DF
2.051

2389.325

1203

0.000

1.986

2280.371

1119

0.000

2.038

2389.325

1210

0.000

1.975

150

NFI

CFI

0.915 0.954
0.910 0.953
0.915 0.954
0.910 0.953

Appendix Figures
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Figure A.2.1 Path model of price judgment
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